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A note from the interim director

A

s I write this, it has been two and a half
months since the war in Ukraine first began
on February 24, 2022, and in the wake of
the global pandemic, our community is once again
pivoting to adapt our planning and operations to
reflect the changing global landscape. In this issue
of The Journal, we feature a timely editorial from
Greg Crowther, Director of Programs at MAG (Mines
Advisory Group). Crowther notes that the legacy of
explosive hazards is not only a future challenge for
the mine action community but a present one, with
unexploded ordnance (UXO), landmines, and cluster munitions threatening civilian lives and hampering humanitarian aid from reaching those who need
it most. In response to the war in Ukraine, Crowther
warns of the risks of an isolated approach to delivering
mine action in the country, calling for a coordinated
response with co-ownership involving donors, NGOs,
national actors, UN agencies, and other humanitarian
organizations. As noted by Crowther,

A grave issue that will unfortunately be an ongoing challenge in Ukraine is the identification of human
remains, often found in areas contaminated with landmines and explosive remnants of war. In this issue, we
feature three articles on the convergence of forensic
humanitarian action (FHA) and humanitarian mine
action (HMA). In their article, “Recovery of Human
Remains in Weapons-Contaminated Settings” Lou
Maresca, Chris Poole, and Dr. Jane Taylor from the
International Committee of the Red Cross provide
guidance to support forensic and mine action operators better understand the issues when human remains
and explosive hazards are both present in an area of
operation. Additionally, an article from Patrick Nowak
of the American Military Institute and an article from
Lauren Cobham et al., highlight differences and identify numerous ways in which FHA and HMA can work
better together, especially in areas of recent conflict
where explosive hazards and human remains coexist.

“the lesson from Iraq and from other major conflicts in places like Syria, Myanmar,
and South Sudan must be learned in Ukraine: the international donor community,
working in partnership, has to put in place the right mechanisms for an effective
mine action response.”

Special thanks to our contributors:
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Additional, timely topics covered in this issue include:
Environmental Impact of MA: Bui Doan Back
(Norwegian People's Aid), Kimberley McCosker
(NPA), and Linsey Cottrell (Conflict and Environmental
Observatory) review the impact of explosive ordnance
on the environment and their results from a pilot project in Vietnam that looked at the impact of heavy
metals from munitions on agricultural soils and the surrounding environment.

MA and Disarmament, Demobilization, and
Reintegration (DDR) Processes: In their article, Laurie
Druelle (independent), Henrique Garbino (Swedish
Defence University), and Eric Mellado Åhlin (independent) seek to identify areas where DDR and HMA
intersect, suggesting methods for future research,
implementation, and discussion around the potentially
synergic relationship between HMA and DDR.

New EOD and IEDD Competency Standards:
Roly Evans from the Geneva International Centre for
Humanitarian Demining discusses the revised Test and
Evaluation Protocol (T&EP) 09.30 explosive ordnance
disposal competency standards and amendments to
the accompanying IMAS 09.30 and the T&EP 09.31
IEDD Competency Standards, a culmination of fouryears’ work to update conventional EOD competencies and to add improvised explosive device disposal
competencies suitable for mine action rather than traditional security tasks.

Thermal Infared Imaging: John Fardoulis (Mobility
Robotics), Xavier Depreytere (Humanity & Inclusion),
and Jonathon Guthrie (Norwegian People’s Aid, NPA)
demonstrate that sub-surface cluster munitions in the
Iraqi desert can be found using thermal infrared imaging and UAVs. They advocate for additional data collection in the field and for greater collaboration between
technical experts and HMA practitioners.

Mental Health and HMA: Dr. Reykhan Munimova
and Dr. Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda from the Tajikistan
National Mine Action Center (TNMAC) highlight how
TNMAC has incorporated psychosocial rehabilitation
into their core victim assistance activities, with further
outreach work done during the pandemic to build
mine survivors’ resilience in managing trauma.
Afghanistan and Tajikistan: In his article, Markus
Schindler (Swiss Foundation for Mine Action, FSD)
looks in depth at Afghanistan’s and Tajikistan’s contamination and the ways in which mine action has
overcome the challenges presented by rugged terrain,
ongoing security concerns, and a fluctuating donor
landscape.
National Clearance Capacity: In Mark Wilkinson’s
(United Nations Mine Action Service, UNMAS) latest
article, he reviews UNMAS’ work in Iraq and discusses
how observations and analysis, when contextualized
within an operational MA environment, can demonstrate benefits in clearance output as well as the efficient use of donor money.

As evident in the articles published in this issue of
The Journal, our community is not only resilient when
presented with global conflict but stronger for working collaboratively. While responding to the current
threats and immediate needs of those living in conflict
and recent post-conflict environments, our contributors have demonstrated the community’s diverse range
of operations encompassing environmental concerns,
survivor assistance, operational standards, and more.
With this in mind, we at CISR relish once again meeting in person at several recent and upcoming events
in Croatia, Montenegro, Munich, and Geneva. We look
forward to seeing you soon.
Safe travels,

Suzanne Fiederlein, PhD
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UKRAINE:

Coordinating the Response
By Greg Crowther [ MAG, Mines Advisory Group ]

T

he war in Ukraine has seen the use of ground and aerial weapons on a scale not seen in Europe
for decades, causing immense devastation and human suffering. And the legacy of explosive
hazards since the onset of the war, in the form of unexploded ordnance, landmines, and cluster
munitions, will take decades to address. It’s a legacy that will kill and injure civilians long after the
conflict has ended. This is not just a problem for the future, however, but a challenge for the present:
explosive ordnance (EO) risks civilian lives, hampers efforts to deliver emergency humanitarian aid,
and prevents people fleeing to safety.
The scale and nature of the unfolding conflict, with bombardments of civilian as well as military infrastructure and the reported
use of a wide range of weapons, including cluster munitions1 and
landmines (which were already affecting Ukraine),2 highlights the
immediate devastation. It also poses immense challenges for the
future mine action response.
At the time of writing, the mine action sector must prioritize
any response that reduces the threat of EO in order to facilitate
the flight of civilians to safe areas and to enable the safe delivery of
humanitarian relief.
A mine action response is needed urgently but cannot be delivered in isolation. What is required is coordination with and coownership by donors, national actors, UN agencies, and other
humanitarian organizations, including local civil society groups,
as well as those mine action operators who have the experience and
expertise to respond on the ground.
The risks of an uncoordinated response or unilateral decisionmaking are all too apparent. At best, money is wasted and resources
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are not properly prioritized. At worst, funding is misused, effort is
duplicated, and operations are carried out unsafely or are prioritized poorly.
The Sphere Core Humanitarian Standards3 that explicitly
enshrine coordination, effectiveness, and timeliness are worth
restating at times like these, when the understandable urge to act
quickly, and emotionally, might lead to poor decision-making.
If coordination is one cornerstone of emergency response, the
other must be preparedness: an international donor community
that can quickly mobilize funding to address urgent needs.
At the time of writing, the most urgent actions—emergency risk
education and real-time tracking of reported explosive impacts—
are already underway in Ukraine. But at the point of peace or a
long-term ceasefire, how confident can we be that the humanitarian mine action (HMA) and international donor communities will
be ready to implement the kind of sustained and large-scale programming required?

This response will be critical to recovery and eventual reconstruction; the success of its implementation is dependent on planning, good practices, and the use of both national and international
expertise. It will require capital investment, recruitment, training,
and considerable engagement and coordination with a host of
stakeholders, not least the affected communities.
As soon as effective survey and clearance are safely feasible, the
slow process of rebuilding communities and enabling Ukrainians
to return to their homes can begin. This will reduce pressures on
host communities and, most importantly, enable ordinary people
to begin to heal from the trauma of war and exile.
In northern Iraq, more than twenty years after the end of the
second Gulf War, MAG teams are still finding and clearing EO that
continues to hamper development and cost lives. More recently,
central Iraq has suffered the devastating consequences of the
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) incursion, a plight that rightly

drew substantial international support. Yet the remaining legacy of
war in the north of the country is all too often forgotten. Tellingly,
as fresh conflict dominates the international consciousness, even
support to the more recent crisis is beginning to dissipate.
The lesson from Iraq and from other major conflicts in places like
Syria, Myanmar, and South Sudan must be learned in Ukraine: the
international donor community, working in partnership, has to put
in place the right mechanisms for an effective mine action response.
Those mechanisms must first respond safely to the most urgent
needs and, second, they must incorporate the structures and
capacities needed to recover from the aftermath of war in the longer term. Critically, any response must be coordinated between
donors and must not jeopardize existing commitments to developing or fragile nations such as Angola or Laos that are still dealing
with the long aftermath of conflict.

The tragedy in Ukraine is having an enormous impact on the civilian population, causing immense
physical and psychological harm. Sadly, the lethal effects of landmines and other EO continue even
when the guns fall silent. Preparing to address this threat must be at the forefront of the humanitarian
response. This protracted and deadly legacy will blight Ukraine for many years to come, making both
an immediate and sustained donor response critical to limiting human suffering and supporting the
reconstruction and rebuilding of Ukraine.
See endnotes page 71

Greg Crowther
Director of Programs
MAG
Greg Crowther is
Director of programs at
MAG. He has more than
two decades of experience in HMA, including
in Angola, Cambodia,
Mali, and Vietnam.
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THE RECOVERY OF HUMAN REMAINS
IN WEAPON-CONTAMINATED SETTINGS:

Towards Guidance for the
Mine Action Community

By Lou Maresca, Chris Poole, and Jane Taylor, PhD [ International Committee of the Red Cross ]

M

ine action and forensic services are critical elements in the response to humanitarian needs
during and after armed conflict. Mine action operators will work to identify, mark, and
eventually clear areas contaminated with landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW).
Forensic specialists and other related experts will be operational in the search for missing persons and
the management of the dead by locating, recovering, and helping to identify human remains, while
ensuring maximum protection, dignity of the deceased, and attention to their families.¹ These professions can often intersect in situations where human remains and explosive hazards are both present.

It is not uncommon for mine action operators to come across
human remains in clearance or explosive ordnance disposal (EOD)
activities. This often occurs when such remains are located in a
suspected or a confirmed hazardous area or in an assessment of
structures damaged during a conflict. There are also times when an
operator is requested to assist a human remains recovery operation
if mines or ERW are found or believed to be present in the area of
excavation and exhumation.
The work of forensic practitioners will sometimes need to take
place in weapon-contaminated settings. For instance, it may be
necessary to search for and exhume sub-surface remains in areas
where mines and ERW are present. Another example is surface
recovery, which involves recovering remains from an open area or
within a collapsed structure following an explosion.2 The recovery
of deceased combatants can be particularly hazardous, as many
will have been killed with explosive ordnance on their person,
and in some contexts the remains of enemy combatants have been
booby trapped, presenting additional explosive hazards to humanitarian forensic personnel and first responders.
Although each profession operates within its own set of professional standards and best practices,3 they also operate under an
overarching framework of law, religious customs, and additional

moral and ethical considerations, which must be taken into
account in each individual situation.
International humanitarian law (IHL) is one of these frameworks. Under this law, all parties to the conflict are required to
respect and provide for the proper management of the deceased.
The Geneva Conventions, their Additional Protocols, and customary IHL contain specific rules on the search for and protection of
the deceased; on the treatment of human remains including their
burial; on the subsequent documentation and maintenance of
gravesites; and on exhumation, examination, identification, and
repatriation. Although the rules themselves are primarily directed
at the parties involved in an armed conflict, they are often reflected
in or influence national legal regulations on the medicolegal death
investigation systems and management of human remains that
must be taken into account. In many instances, however, the relevant state entities, including national mine action authorities
(NMAAs), are not aware of these requirements or do not have in
place the necessary procedures and practices to ensure that they are
followed. There have been cases where human remains have been
broken apart or buried without forensic identification or means of
traceability, and without consideration of local cultural or religious
methods and sensitivities.

Ethiopia and Eritrea: From 2001 to 2002, several demining organizations were operating on the border
between the two countries. This was a time when some governments favored bilateral aid packages and
programs that involved heavy equipment. As a result, mine action organizations were under pressure to
configure and build operations around flails and other capital-intensive machines. During one operation, a
flail deployed to clear anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines uncovered human remains in shallow graves.
Unfortunately, it took some time for the operator to realize what was happening. The machine damaged
forensic evidence and separated body parts and artefacts, making identification almost impossible.
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Forensic clues or explosive remnants of war?

Photo by Alberto Gobez-Pastrano 2016. All images courtesy of ICRC.

Guidance to Support Forensic/EOD Operations
There is a need to generate better understanding, planning, and
coordination with regard to the recovery of human remains in
weapon-contaminated settings. It was with this in mind that the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) published a set
of guidelines on this topic in 2019 called The Recovery of Human
Remains in Weapon-Contaminated Settings.4 This guide aims to
help both the mine action and forensic services sectors, including
first responders, better understand the issues involved when both
human remains and explosive hazards are present, and develop
appropriate responses in a deliberate and collaborative manner
whenever possible. The guide primarily addresses situations where
forensic and EOD operations are available and where both are able
to plan and work collaboratively. The main elements of the guidelines can be summarized as follows:
Guiding principles. Joint forensic and EOD operations
should operate under three main principles. These principles (1)
prioritize the health and safety of staff over human remains
recovery (no death is worth another life), (2) the safety of the

local communities near operations, and (3) the imperative need
to treat the deceased with dignity.
Framework for planning. The guidelines also outline a
framework for planning with a focus on key operational practices.
• Assess first, recover second. If there is any doubt as to
whether human remains can be recovered safely, operations
should not begin until the appropriate expertise is available
or until awareness training or other mitigation measures are
in place.5
• Establish and maintain a common approach path (i.e., an
agreed route in and out) to and from the site of interest.

Mine action specialists should ensure that this path is both free
from explosives and is located outside the danger zone should
a nearby item of ordnance explode. The approach path is also
the extraction route in the event of an accident or injury. For
this reason, it should be clearly marked using well understood
methods, and the medical point should be located near the
control point, at the entrance to the approach path.

Bosnia and Herzegovina: The presence of mines and ERW in and around gravesites in eastern Bosnia
and Herzegovina presented a significant operational challenge in the two decades following the conflict.
In one instance, a sub-surface mass grave was covered over with a minefield. This was not thought to be a
deliberate act to obscure or block access to the gravesite but rather the reality of rapidly changing frontlines.
In such instances, the excavation teams adopted a simple solution: a mine clearance organization would use
detectors, dogs, and other means to carry out a surface clearance before the forensic specialists moved in.
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For thirty years, the ICRC has
been helping people in Georgia
proper,
Abkhazia,
and
South
Ossetia affected by the armed conflicts of the 1990s and August 2008.
As part of its action on missing persons and their families, in 2010, the
ICRC helped establish two coordination mechanisms 6 between the
sides with the sole humanitarian
purpose to clarify the fate of more
than 2,300 persons who were missing in relation to the armed conflicts and to return their remains to
their families. With the ICRC acting
as neutral intermediary and chair,
the coordination mechanisms serve
as platforms to exchange information relevant for the search for
missing persons, a process which is
ICRC staff searching for human remains Abkhazia/Georgia in 2021.
carried out with local stakeholders
trained and supported by the ICRC.
ICRC Weapons Contamination (WeC) experts have supported forensic operations in Abkhazia since 2012.
While tens of thousands of mines and unexploded ordnance have been cleared,7 a significant risk from
contamination remains.⁸ For this reason, the ICRC has integrated EOD technical elements into its forensic
operations in order to ensure the safety of all personnel involved. Additionally, it supports the safe retrieval
of human remains for later analysis and, it is hoped, their return to family members.
The collaboration of the ICRC forensic and WeC units provides an excellent example of the collaborative
approach outlined in the ICRC guidelines published in 2019. The risks were anticipated, and a strategy prepared. As part of the assessment and planning, standard operating procedures were developed and all staff
were appropriately trained. Importantly, the training of local EOD experts from 2019 has also ensured ongoing support and sustainability for the work.

•

Employ context appropriate forensic methods. The
forensic procedures must take into account the scope and
objectives of the forensic operation, the legal framework
of the country, the resources available, and affected families and communities, including religious and cultural
considerations.

•

Consider forensic objectives and context appropriate EOD procedures. This not only involves how best to

safely remove or neutralize the hazard at hand (e.g., insitu, semi-remote movement, low-order techniques) but
also having those decisions informed by the context and
the understanding of the likely effect of an explosion during the forensic process and the potential of irreparable
damage and loss of information.
•

Collaborate to use technical capabilities and skill sets

efficiently. It is in the interests of everyone, including
local communities and donors, to use enabling capabilities as economically and as efficiently as possible.
Although the bulk of the guidelines are directed at joint or
collaborative EOD forensic operations, there are a number of
practical steps that can be drawn from them to help mine action

10
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operators orient themselves on the issue of human remains located
in weapon-contaminated environments.
Anticipate. Every mine action operation should anticipate the
issue, whether it is likely to arise from a body being found incidentally in the course of mine clearance or an EOD operation, or
when it is requested to support an existing or new human remains
recovery operation. Practice has shown that it arises in many contexts and operations.
Prepare a strategy. In every context where human remains
are expected or likely to be found, there must be a discussion
with the NMAA to ensure a proper understanding of the procedures and expectations as to how any found remains are to be
managed and to whom such an event should be reported. This
reporting is the basic practice that should be required of all mine
action operations.
Assess and plan. Some of the factors that should be considered and assessed as part of an initial planning process
include the
• likelihood of human remains being found
• location of the remains, their immediate environment (surface, buried, under collapsed structures, etc.), their likely

status (combatant, civilian, etc.), and their likely
condition
• types of weapons and extent of contamination in
the area (to determine which area of expertise has
primacy at which site)
• potential need for specific EOD competence and
equipment (e.g., risk of finding deceased combatants booby-trapped or equipped with person-borne
improvised explosive devices [PBIED])
• availability of forensic services
• likely duration of a clearance operation in and
around the location and the resources required.
There are certainly other elements that must be part of
this reflection and which are drawn from the specific situation. Activities related to the management of any human
remains found (e.g., reporting, documentation, recovery,
collection of personal effects) are also relevant and should
be established in the discussions with the NMAA or other
relevant authorities and services.

Towards New IMAS Guidance

ICRC recovers human remains at an airport in
Donetsk, Ukraine, in 2015.

The International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) already
include a Technical Note (TN) on the management of human
remains, which provides some guidance to mine action operators.9 This TN, however, is limited to situations where remains
are incidentally found during clearance activities and where no
forensic support is available, and as a result does not take into
account many of the joint planning and multidisciplinary aspects
of a collaborative approach that would be required in other situations. In 2019, the ICRC was given a mandate by the IMAS Review
Board to prepare a new IMAS chapter and a TN on the recovery
of human remains for consideration by the review board. This

Lou Maresca
Deputy Head
Weapon Contamination Unit
International Committee of the Red Cross
Lou Maresca is Deputy Head of the Weapon
Contamination Unit of the ICRC. He joined the
ICRC in 1995 and since then has worked on the
legal, policy, and operational aspects of the ICRC’s and Red Cross
and Red Crescent Movement’s response to landmines, cluster
munitions, and explosive remnants of war. His main areas of work
currently focus on supporting the ICRC’s weapon contamination
programs in the ield, coordinating and developing ICRC contributions to the International Mine Action Standards, and working
with ICRC delegation’s and National Red Cross Societies’ risk
awareness and safer behavior programs.

work is currently being discussed in a Technical Working Group,
coordinated by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian
Demining with support from the ICRC. It is hoped that the results
of this work will contribute to a greater awareness of the challenges
that arise at the intersection of humanitarian mine action and
forensics activities, provide appropriate guidance to address them,
and ensure that human remains can be recovered safely and in line
with the requirements of IHL as well as other applicable legal rules,
religious customs, and moral and ethical considerations.
See endnotes page 71

Christopher Poole
Regional Manager
Weapon Contamination Unit
International Committee of the Red Cross
Christopher Poole is Regional Manager of
the Weapon Contamination Unit of the ICRC,
based in Moscow, advising on mine action and
ammunition management matters in the Eurasia region. Poole
has worked in explosive threat mitigation and mine action for
over thirty years, initially with the British Army and later with
the United Nations and the commercial Counter-IED sector.
Most recently, he has worked in the disputed territories of
Nagorno Karabakh during the 2020 conflict and in Moldova in
early 2022, undertaking an ammunition management program.

Jane Taylor, PhD
Regional Forensic Manager, Eurasia
International Committee of the Red Cross
Jane Taylor, PhD, is the Regional Forensic Manager for Eurasia for the ICRC. She is a specialist forensic
odontologist with over thirty years’ experience in Australian Disaster Victim Identification responses.
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Humanitarian Mine Action and
Humanitarian Forensic Action
By Lauren Cobham,i Nicholas Márquez-Grant,i Caroline Barker,ii César Sanabria Medina,iii
Javier Naranjo-Santana,iv Gareth Collett,v and Mike Harrisi
i Cranfield Forensic Institute, Cranfield University
ii Independent Forensic Anthropologist and Archaeologist
iii Biomedical Science Research Group, School of Medicine, University Antonio Nariño
iv The European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo
v United Nations Development Programme

H

umanitarian mine action (HMA) and
humanitarian forensic action (HFA)
have had a global impact in recent
decades. However, these two areas could
work more closely together in view of some
of the contexts in which they operate. Often
when HMA operators clear explosive ordnance (EO) after conflict, they find human
remains, especially in urban areas. When
human remains are encountered, operators have responsibilities to ensure that
they are dealt with appropriately. When
human remains are encountered, they must
be dealt with appropriately. In the event
that HMA and HFA actors are present in a
humanitarian arena, there is a need for an
increased awareness and understanding
of each other’s role. Similarly, forensic scientists working to recover human remains
may encounter mines, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), or explosive remnants
of war (ERW), and they should also actively
enable HMA support.. This article examines
the extent of the cooperation to date and
identifies ways in which it can be improved.
Recommendations and practical measures
are provided to encourage a higher degree
of collaboration going forward.

Figure 1. Disarticulated skeletonized human
remains found within building rubble in
Western Mosul, Iraq, 2017.
Image courtesy of Caroline Barker.

Civilian-led mine action developed in the late 1980s.1 The
term humanitarian mine action (HMA) emerged when the
removal of explosive threats in post-conf lict contexts became
necessary to protect people facing indiscriminate harm, support
survivors, and restore basic services.2 As a recognized protection activity under the international humanitarian coordination (cluster) system,3 HMA has its own international standards
for clearing EO for humanitarian purposes,4 including devices
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such as IEDs and booby-traps.5,6 Regulated by international normative agreements and international humanitarian law (IHL),
HMA actors also assist states committed to certain international
conventions.
Forensic archaeologists and anthropologists have been working
since the 1980s to search, recover, and identify human remains
from conflict zones.9,10,11,12 It is humanitarian forensic action (HFA)
or forensic humanitarianism,13 that involves the use of forensic

science for the recovery and identification of
the deceased for humanitarian reasons, rather
than for criminal investigations. Coined by
the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) to separate the humanitarian characteristics of forensic science,14 HFA originated
from its use in the field of human rights and
expanded globally in managing the dead during
and following conflict.15 As a frontline response,
HFA has the ameliorative intentions16 of ‘protecting the dignity of the dead,’17 and recovering and identifying the dead to support families
awaiting news of their missing relatives.
Under IHL,18 HFA aims to uphold the dignity
of the deceased, the right to memorialization,
commemoration and reparations, the right
to know, and the right to inform families.19 In
practical terms, it involves searching and identifying human remains for humanitarian purposes and returning the dead to living relatives
where possible. 20 Associated forensic evidence
also generates “proof of death” and death certification that can be critical for the living and
surviving families. 21,22
HMA and HFA adhere to the same humanitarian principles and have common goals rooted
in IHL, 23 yet neither are without controversy
nor opposing views of the impact of their interventions.24 Assurances of neutrality are vital
for HMA operators to gain access to areas for
clearance. Similarly, the neutrality of humanitarian action towards the dead and when using
forensic science for the purpose of establishing
Figure 2. Remains found near an item of UXO on a former
identification is critical for HFA. Humanitarian
battlefield in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.
principles should be applied without adverse
Image courtesy of Roly Evans.
distinction and regardless of political or any
• Buried human remains. On these occasions, mass
other opinion. 25 This is not always appreciated by some parties to
graves may be in minefields and/or may contain boobyconflict which can hamper both HMA and HFA activities.
traps. Unstable EO may have also been buried with the
HFA operations have ranged from the excavation of mass graves
deceased.
and analysis of human remains in countries such as Bosnia and
The increased use of IEDs in open areas and urban spaces have
Herzegovina, Kosovo, Colombia, Cambodia, Rwanda, Sri Lanka,
and Iraq. During these missions, forensic specialists have encoun- added new challenges since 2010. 26,27 IEDs have been used to tartered explosive devices. Likewise, human remains have invariably get first responders28,29 and humanitarian actors have been faced
been found over the course of HMA operations in these same with a wider range of EO. For HMA, certain IEDs arguably prescountries. There are two main scenarios where EO and human ent a higher risk, along with the presence of human remains and
all the safety risks and ethical considerations this entails. For
remains coexist:
• Surface and/or rubble buried human remains. See HFA, the presence of EO poses a clear threat to life and prevents
figures 1 and 2, where human remains are evident during access for the safe and appropriate recovery of the dead. Also,
conflict, and EO is present alongside the bodies of civilians human remains often need to be recovered quickly, not only for
and/or combatants. In some cases, bodies found in building reasons of dignity, but to adhere to cultural norms and to maindestruction may be wearing suicide vests, be carrying EO tain relations with the local community. Human remains discovsuch as hand grenades, or be pierced with unexploded ord- ered in the ground or rubble, or in individual or mass graves, can
represent men, women, and/or children, and both civilians and/
nance (UXO) such as rocket-propelled grenades.

ISSUE 25.3 @ SPRING 2022

13

and/or combatants from either side of a conflict. The perception that human remains may
belong to a perpetrator of the conflict 30 may
adversely affect the management of the dead
(Figure 3). 31
Often, both sectors must find solutions
to work around these challenges (Figure 4).
There is a clear rationale for HMA and HFA to
collaborate more broadly to better prepare for
the operational environments encountered
today.32 Within the context of international
law frameworks33 this may also be viewed as
an obligation for national governments that
HMA and HFA seek to support.34
This paper seeks to present practical measures that can be taken in the short to medium
term to bridge the perceived application gap
between the two disciplines of HMA and
HFA. Broader discussion on competing objectives and obligations35 can help in framing the
debate under the guiding humanitarian principle of “do no harm,”36 and integrated and
multidisciplinary approaches are needed for
where EO is encountered alongside, and in
conjunction with, human remains.

Figure 3. Human remains among the rubble in Al Maydan
District, Iraq, 2017. Claimed to be an ISIL fighter, the remains
were left untouched as HMA operations progressed around
the deceased. A large amount of EO near the vicinity made
access for clearance difficult and time consuming.
Figure courtesy of Gareth Collett.

HMA and HFA Operations
Post-conflict humanitarian action37 covers a spectrum of involvement from a range of different actors.38 HFA and HMA areas of
work intersect at the operational level. This occurs when HMA
operators are asked to provide technical support for HFA teams
due to the perceived or known threat of EO, 39 or when human
remains are incidentally found during HMA operations and HFA
support is required.40 In both these scenarios, once all safety considerations have been taken into account, the appropriate management of the dead is the main challenge. HMA requires assistance to
remove human remains and avoid associated operational disruptions. While the aim for HFA is the identification of the dead and
return of the remains to relatives where possible, the right circumstances are necessary for the effective management of the dead and
the recovery of forensic evidence and/or DNA sampling for human
identification. This begins at the scene, which is where HMA and
HFA must interact.
The precedent for collaboration between HMA and HFA
exists. Over the decades, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) support has been provided to assist the excavation and recovery of
human remains, or to clear areas for HFA operations to take place.
Examples include Kosovo, Cyprus, Iraq, Colombia, and recently
the increased search for remains from the First and Second World
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War battlefields.41 During these operations, joint planning has
minimized potential damage to human remains at the scene as well
as the risk from EO for HFA teams, and multi-disciplinary expertise and integrated planning, however, are not routinely applied
to support HMA operators when human remains are incidentally
found. In this scenario, there is less precedence for cooperation,
and requests for HFA support are often tied to the availability of
funds, resources, and permissions from authorities and donors.
The following provides an overview of some of these challenges:
• The discovery of human remains interrupts and/or
halts clearance operations. If found at an operational site,
HMA work is usually halted to prevent destruction of remains
and evidence.42 Remains are reported to local authorities in the
first instance, and operators demarcate the area and move on
to another site until they are recovered to avoid disruptions to
operations (Figure 4). Requirements for reporting are usually
bound by national law. In post-conflict situations the availability of assistance from authorities is often limited. In Yemen
for example, human remains are discovered on a regular basis
during the clearance of EO from dwellings and public infrastructure, with minimal to no recovery by relevant authorities,
which can impact HMA operations.

Buildings may be unsound or the explosive contamination so great that access to human remains cannot
be ensured in a timely fashion. This can be distressing
for the local population. The use of IEDs in urban spaces—
where there were human remains within and around homes
and infrastructure in Yemen or in the urban rubble in Iraq
(Figure 5)—presented unpredictable three-dimensional
challenges for HMA operators43,44 and demanded a high level
of technical competency to be able to operate effectively.45
These environments required HMA operators to draw on
technological advancements and use specialized equipment
where available,46 such as multi-sensor detectors, computed
tomography (CT) imaging, and unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs) to survey complex urban environments.
HMA operations should therefore be planned carefully, not
only to confirm that the remains and immediate area are free
from explosives (FFE), but to also ensure that contextual evidence is not destroyed so that the deceased can be recovered for
identification and returned to relatives (Figure 6). Ensuring the
minimal destruction of remains and evidence, and liaising with
families and the local population, are issues that HFA assistance
can help to address.
The effects of EO during HFA operations are similarly disruptive:
• Potential EO can delay human remains recovery
efforts. HFA requires a safe environment for search,
recording, recovery, and the tracking/maintenance of chain
of custody to support further examination/analysis of
human remains. If EO is suspected or EOD support is not
available, HFA activities are delayed. In Colombia, there
have been instances where it’s taken several weeks or months
•

•

•

for explosive hazards at the scene to be addressed. Response
times have depended on the location and access to the site.
Risks and endangerment to personal safety. The
search and excavation of human remains can be hazardous if EO is present at the scene. Examples include mass
graves in Kosovo where the presence of hand grenades with
corroded pins have been found interred with the human
remains; depositions in mined areas and wells in abandoned
farms and villages in Colombia, or mass grave sites located
in minefields and alongside booby-trapped devices in Iraq.
HFA personnel must be cognizant of the potential explosive
hazards in their working environment, and they must have
the assurance that recovered remains and items are FFE to
ensure safety within the subsequent identification processes.
First responders lack forensic expertise which can
corrupt/compromise/lose contextual information
relevant to establishing identification and/or inadvertently commingle remains. Ideally, remains are
recovered by forensic scientists (such as forensic archaeologists or anthropologists) and taken to a mortuary alongside
any clothing and personal effects for analysis and identification.47 The reality is that an effective and qualified response
is often not immediately available, and first responders deal
with the issue of human remains during which time important evidence for determining identity is lost. Self-help
recovery operations by the local population may be undertaken, unaware of the circumstances needed for effective
recovery, or first responders may attempt to preserve graves/
human remains or place remains out of the context in which
they are found, risking their misidentifications or incomplete recovery. Recoveries by non-experts can also result in
the commingling of bones from several individuals, which
may hinder identification.

Human Remains and HMA
Responsibilities

Figure 4. The push button switch (in circle) of a suicide vest
associated with human remains sits in precarious rubble, Mosul,
Iraq, 2017. The clearance of human remains and the presence of
IEDs and switches in urban areas underline the need for HMA
and HFA to develop ways to work effectively together.
Image courtesy of Gareth Collett.

Can HMA actors discharge their humanitarian responsibilities when faced with human remains? HMA and HFA are
intrinsically linked by IHL and other international laws/treaties,
as well as to obligations and objectives to achieve “normalcy.” The
clearance of EO allows people to return home, enables land rights,
and permits land use linked to livelihoods, and the identification of
the dead grants for remarriage, inheritance, and other rights such
as reparation and closure.
The challenges facing HMA requires HFA support. HMA operators must also be better informed and aware of their humanitarian responsibilities when encountering human remains in contexts
where there is EO. As an often critical first line of response in
post-conflict, HMA involvement with human remains may be
unavoidable due to security, to resolve operational interruptions
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and maintain relations with communities,
or when there is a time-lag before expert
recovery is provided. Available guidelines
for HMA on the management of human
remains require an update,48 and while
some standards exist for the handling of
human remains, these are related to demining accidents and workplace incidents.50
Further details are necessary to assist
HMA operators when human remains are
found during routine operations and when
incidents have occurred involving nonHMA personnel.
The opinion that the challenges for
HMA are not enough to warrant specific
guidance on the management of human
remains in an operational environment
illustrates the need for a better understanding and awareness of HFA. To its
credit, this is being considered by a dedicated technical working group under the
International Mine Action Standards
Figure 5. This destroyed building contains disarticulated, disassociated, and
(IMAS) Review Board.51 While HMA
commingled human remains along with EO and fragments/remnants of suicide vests,
actors do not have technical competence western Mosul, 2017.
or mandate to recover human remains, Figure courtesy of Caroline Barker.
it will continue to find itself in situations where it must draw on there is minimal HFA assistance available. HFA must inform what
HFA for support. Therefore, it is arguably the responsibility of the is required from HMA to achieve these aims and ensure that HMA
HFA community to raise awareness of IHL and concomitant obli- actors understand that the deceased and the “missing”53 should be
gations, and to advocate for the treatment/management of human identified, how the identification process works, and the necessary
remains with the HMA community, as opposed to HMA actors evidence needed to achieve this where possible. While the ICRC
taking the lead.
has taken steps to address this challenge, and HMA and HFA are
Collaborating with HFA to develop and update operational working together in some contexts, 54,55 this collaboration could be
guidance and standards will support and prepare HMA when more broadly improved.

A Call for Multi-Disciplinary Operational Integration
HMA and HFA differ in terms of mandate; however, both have
well established practices that aim to address similar problems for
similar reasons.56 For instance, there is a close resemblance between
HMA standard operating procedures (SOPs) and the high intensity
survey standards required in forensic archaeology and anthropology recovery.57 Both HMA and HFA employ rigorous methods—
on-site photography, examining witness accounts, documenting
“finds,” identifying surface anomalies and topographic conditions,
and using grid search and geospatial survey approaches. 58 HMA
operators are also increasingly using advanced technologies such
as CT imaging and UAV footage in complex environments, and
regularly create datasets and share information with other actors
to support broader humanitarian responses. If this was extended
to HFA teams, their operations would be better informed on the
nature and context of a scene and subsequent human remains evidence and recovery strategies.
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The development of joint guidance and basic training would
enable HFA aims to be better understood and could be factored
into a cooperative framework for HMA and HFA entities when
working together. HFA should be a relevant stakeholder in HMA
operations, and HMA should avoid a siloed approach.59 This would
encourage the consideration of minimally destructive or alternate HMA clearance techniques in operational sites with human
remains and to preserve evidence for identification and death
certification. Furthermore, to achieve technical competency in
contemporary conflicts, humanitarian actors need to adapt to the
changing humanitarian environment.60 Documenting where and
how human remains and EO have been found will ensure datasets
and relevant distribution patterns are available to inform future
humanitarian interventions.

Conclusion
The complexities associated with EO and human remains at the
end of conflict are typical features of past, current, and future conflicts. Collaboration between HMA and HFA has been in practice
for more than twenty years, however, given the current challenges
facing HMA and HFA actors, it is necessary to explore how this can
be built upon and applied routinely, particularly in complex urban
spaces. As HMA is often in the lead in post-conflict humanitarian
response, human remains will be invariably encountered. HMA
actors should therefore know and be aware of their humanitarian
responsibilities, and of HFA actors involved in managing the dead
in conflict. To help ensure this, the following recommendations are
put forward with practical measures that can be applied:
• HFA should take the advocacy lead and intensify
the dialogue to ensure that the HMA sector understands the circumstances required to achieve its
aims. HFA should be a stakeholder and raise awareness of
IHL and concomitant obligations so that a humanitarian
principled approach is factored into operational planning
and preparation. The IMAS technical working group established to review technical guidance on the management of
human remains would be a useful forum for HFA actors to
participate and take on an advocacy lead.
• Routine, multi-disciplinary, and integrated planning should take place to address any perceived
challenges associated with the discovery of human
remains. A flexible guiding framework for HMA and HFA
cooperation should be applied to suit the context and complement the capacities of relevant national stakeholders.
When developing HMA clearance plans, operations managers should routinely assess whether there is a likelihood

Figure 6. Disarticulated remains and camouflaged patterned
clothing in the rubble in west Mosul demonstrates the need for
careful operational planning (2017).
Figure courtesy of Caroline Barker.

of encountering human remains. Where such a likelihood
exists, simple contingency planning should take place as a
norm.
• HMA and HFA should regularly share information, data, and new and emerging technologies for
mutual benefit, understanding, and planning. An
inventory of methods, techniques, and procedures would
allow both sectors to draw on mutually beneficial resources
and inform operational strategies. Sharing datasets and footage from UAVs and CTs would assist both sectors when operating in complex urban spaces.
• Referral systems/pathways for HMA and other
humanitarian actors should be set up to access relevant HFA experts. Coordinated through the international
humanitarian cluster system, referral systems could address
operational interruptions associated with the incidental
discovery of human remains for HMA and/or other actors
involved in reconstruction efforts.
• Amplification of existing guidelines and recommendations issued by international organizations
on managing the dead. Published literature such as the
PAHO manual on the “Management of Dead Bodies after
Disasters”61 which are designed for first responders, provides
guidance on consequential, simple tasks ensuring the later
recovery and identification of the deceased. Learning from
case scenarios developed by HMA and HFA would also assist
with this management.
• Basic training provisions for HMA and HFA actors.
HMA should consider developing a basic human remains
awareness course, integrating expertise from the HFA sector. This would equip HMA, as sometimes the first responders in conflict, with better HFA understanding. While ad hoc
training for HFA teams in EO awareness occurs, it should be
routinely applied so HFA teams are aware of HMA and the
risks of EO.
HMA does not, and should not, work in a bubble. It is essential that, where cooperation with other disciplines is necessary to
achieve humanitarian aims, HMA acts accordingly. In instances
where human remains are found during operations, a better understanding of and increased cooperation with HFA is not only desirable but necessary. Where possible, methods and techniques should
be combined in line with humanitarian principles. By improving
cooperation, there is clear potential for HMA and HFA to improve
operational outcomes while achieving the ultimate objectives of
humanitarian action: to save lives, alleviate human suffering, and
maintain human dignity during and in the aftermath of conflict.
See endnotes page 71
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T

his article aims to identify the opportunities for synergy that exist globally between humanitarian mine action (HMA) and humanitarian forensic action (HFA) through the lens of their specific
objectives. Moreover, it recommends how best to leverage existing touchpoints and establish
networks between the two disciplines; explores the access and placement that can enhance both mine
action and forensic objectives; shows how subject-matter experts currently remain underutilized in
explosive mitigation missions and human remains recovery operations; and indicates how to remedy
that through combined efforts.
For those who have worked in an HMA capacity in postconflict zones, it is not uncommon to encounter the remains of
those who were embroiled in the original conflict and perished.
These encounters pose unique challenges to HMA specialists
who are not explicitly trained in managing corpses, identifying
remains, or the ethical and legal standards for adequately dealing with remains. Additionally, dealing with these challenges far
exceeds the scope of work typically outlined in HMA operations.
Fortunately, HFA is an emerging discipline that specifically provides for the tasking and training of individuals to deal with this
kind of work. However, similar to HMA specialists, HFA personnel may lack the requisite skills and training to recover human

remains within an environment contaminated with explosives.
Ultimately, these disciplines are not mutually exclusive, both crossing the line of each other’s missions, specifically within the postconflict operating environment. Unfortunately, because HMA and
HFA are two separate disciplines with separately stated objectives,
current efforts remain stove piped within their respective disciplines, which can reduce the overall effectiveness of both. However,
interoperability opportunities exist to provide holistic benefits to
both HMA and HFA missions by utilizing specialized personnel to
provide a more significant impact to the populations these organizations are attempting to support.

HMA: Not Simply a Clearance Operation
HMA is a unique and dangerous job that requires specialized
training and experience to conduct safely. Multiple organizations around the globe support HMA operations, such as the U.S.
Department of Defense (DoD), nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs), and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), each with
specific authorities and slightly different missions. For instance,
the U.S. Department of Defense can supply conventional forces to
support “nations plagued by land mines and Explosive Remnants of
War (ERW) by executing ‘train-the-trainer’ programs of instruction designed to develop indigenous capabilities for a wide range
of HMA activities.”1 Within the authorities outlined in CJCSI
3702.01C, U.S. military forces engaged in HMA operations “may
not engage in the physical detection, lifting, or destroying of land
mines, or stockpiled munitions, or other ERW, unless it is done
for the concurrent purpose of supporting US military operations.”1
Conversely, NGOs and IGOs have the authority to train and assist
host nations in the physical detection and disposal of ERW and
landmines to include education, stockpile destruction, victim

assistance, survey, mapping, and marking functions.2 The responsibilities that HMA organizations have are outlined in the United
Nations Mine Action Service’s (UNMAS) five pillars of mine
action.3 Additionally, international humanitarian law (IHL) and
human rights law establish the legal foundation for mine action,
with several other treaties, policies, and conventions providing
additional guidance.3 Even though some HMA activities are limited in their capacity to assist nations, the overall goal of relieving
human suffering by reducing the social, economic, and environmental impact from ERW and landmines is common throughout
all HMA activities.2,4
However, notably absent in these guiding instructions are
requirements or obligations to deal with corpses or human remains.
Because a significant number of HMA operations deal with postconflict zones, the likelihood of encountering human remains and
corpses is high. The HMA mission then becomes more than just a
clearance operation, and additional organizations that specialize
in the management and identification of the deceased are required.
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Like HMA, HFA is a difficult job requiring highly specialized
training and experience. According to Cordner and Tidball-Binz, 5
the field of HFA originated from the Katyn Forest Massacre in
World War II, utilizing forensic science to evaluate the mass killings that took place there. More recently, the Argentine Forensic
Anthropology Team (EAAF), an NGO created in the 1980s after a
violent regime change in Argentina, was established to locate “the
disappeared” and supply answers to the families who lost their
loved ones.5,6 The work of the EEAF, American Association of the
Advancement of Science (AAAS), and Dr. Snow marked the beginning of modern-day humanitarian forensic action.7
Currently, the leading global organization for HFA is the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The ICRC
defines humanitarian forensics as the “application of forensic science to humanitarian activities that seek to alleviate human suffering and protect the dignity of all victims of armed conflict and
catastrophes, framed under International Humanitarian Law and
Human Rights Law.5 HFA’s foundation is built upon these two
international laws and their mission follows five pillars: (1) “the
dignity of the dead must be respected; (2) families have a right to
know the fate of their relatives; (3) religion, belief, and culture must

be respected; (4) the right to health
must be protected; (5) and serious
violation of international humanitarian law and international crimes
must be prosecuted.”8
Alongside these five pillars, the
ICRC has the specific mission of
training host nation counterparts
and establishing forensic capabilities
within host nations.9 As a testament
to humanitarian forensics’ roots and
the work of Dr. Snow in developing
the EAAF, this mission continues
today. Unfortunately, a significant
driving force behind ICRC training
and advisory mission is the nearly
constant conflict happening around
the globe.10,11 However, the ICRC has
significantly contributed to worldwide forensic programs through its advisement and promotion of
best standards of practice.11 Organizations like the ICRC increase
their global capacity to support humanitarian forensics by building indigenous capabilities within nations.
Due to the nature of their work, HFA specialists work extensively in explosively contaminated areas, typically those emerging
from conflict.11 There is a significant risk to forensic specialists
when working in these environments. Humanitarian forensic specialists do not possess the required training and expertise to deal
with explosive threats and are severely hampered in their ability
to work in these environments. Forensic scientists assume unnecessary risk in completing their mission without the assistance of
specially trained explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) technicians.
Along with the ICRC—NGOs, IGOs, and nationally affiliated
defense organizations provide humanitarian forensic efforts in
support of alleviating human suffering. Notably, the U.S. Defense
POW/MIA Accounting Agency (DPAA) is the responsible organization for recovering, identifying, and returning the remains
of U.S. service members unaccounted for or killed in conflict.12 In
many cases, DPAA requests the assistance of military EOD and
NGOs to ensure the appropriate handling of unexploded ordnance
(UXO) at suspected human remains sites, highlighting the need
for synergy between forensic specialists and mine disposal experts.

At their foundation, both HMA and HFA are governed by the
same laws: IHL and human rights laws. However, they vary slightly
by treaty, policy, and convention; and the forensic evidence found
around human remains can be used as evidence to support criminal cases, investigations, or allegations of IHL violations.
Still, it is apparent that there are many similarities in the ultimate objectives of HMA and HFA, with their primary mission
of relieving human suffering being the same. Because of this, it
becomes significantly easier to develop synergy between these

two disciplines. For instance, DoD HMA and ICRC HFA possess similar goals of training host nations to build an organic
capability. 8,9 Mikellide expands upon this, stating that training
and establishing local forensic capabilities that provide sustainable solutions to humanitarian issues is a key objective of
the ICRC.10 Though these separate organizations have different
ways and means to achieve their ends, their ends go hand in
hand with one another. Let us brief ly look at a specific case
study that demonstrates the aligned objectives of HMA and

The ICRC conducts training at the African
School for Humanitarian Forensic Action.
Image courtesy of the ICRC.

HFA: Hazards of the Job

Aligned Objectives: The Same, but Different
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HFA, the synergy used to complete the mission,
and the challenges posed in the current humanitarian action environment.

Kiribati: A Case Study
In 2016, the Office of Weapons Removal and
Abatement in the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau
of Political-Military Affairs (PM/WRA) deployed its
Quick Reaction Force (QRF) managed by the Golden
West Humanitarian Foundation (GWHF) to Tarawa
to assist the government of Kiribati with the safe disposal of ERW. On two occasions during the elevenmonth operation, human remains were located in
the excavation and UXO sites.13 The overall mission
for GWHF did not specify how to deal with human
remains, and the QRF personnel had no training or Members of the DPAA conducting search and recovery efforts in the area of
a B-24J crash site in Arunachal Pradesh, India .
expertise in handling these situations. In order to
Image courtesy of SSgt Erik Cardenas, U.S. Air Force.
properly manage the discovered remains, the QRF
reached out to the U.S. Embassy in Suva who coordinated with to provide assistance. However, according to the Golden West QRF
DPAA to travel to the site and conduct HFA activities in support of final report , the presence of human remains and a lack of coordithe QRF. Significant logistical hurdles, resourcing, and extensive nation and cooperation between the HFA NGO and DPAA had a
time delays precluded DPAA from being able to travel to the Kiribati significant impact on the HMA operation.13 This lack of coordinasite and assist with the human remains recovery. Fortunately, and tion led to extensive periods where work could not be conducted
in a completely uncoordinated and separate effort, History Flight, by GWHF QRF personnel, extending the overall operation and
a U.S. humanitarian forensics NGO, was also operating in the local exposing personnel to risk for a greater period of time than necarea, recovering human remains from a Tarawa plane crash site, essary. The complex working environment precluded DPAA perand GWHF QRF personnel were able to reach out to the team and sonnel from being on scene and ultimately turned over custody of
quickly coordinate efforts. U.S. Army Col. (ret) Allan Vosburgh, the scene to History Flight to assist GWHF QRF in managing the
Chief Executive Officer of GWHF, stated “Luckily, we had access to human remains.13 Not everything was doom and gloom, however.
a trained anthropologist, schooled in recovery of human remains, Personnel on the ground were able to find solutions by gaining the
from an organization engaged in recovering a plane crash site. We authority to work together and continuing to carry out HMA work
took care of their UXO, and they took the bones off our hands. That in areas of the site that did not contain human remains, expediting
the process. Additionally, having both HMA and HFA organizais unusual, and we are frequently left to our own devices.”
Charged with the management of the remains and due to DPAA’s tions working together demonstrated the potential usefulness of
logistical issues, DPAA attempted to coordinate with History Flight integrated and co-located humanitarian action forces to achieve
their missions.

Personnel from the QRF and Kiribati Police Service (KPS)
recover ERW.
Image courtesy of GWHF.

Personnel from the QRF and KPS remove ordnance from the
site for disposal.
Image courtesy of GWHF.
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Existing Synergy: The Building Blocks of Something Great
The Kiribati case study demonstrates some of the existing synergy between HMA and HFA operations. The current environment
of humanitarian action is complex and profoundly challenging
and needs innovative organizations to find solutions to save lives
and provide answers to awaiting families.10 When the opportunity
presents itself, working collaboratively satisfies the goals of both
disciplines. In this instance, the ability to leverage existing touchpoints between NGOs, the U.S. Department of State, and the U.S.
Department of Defense allowed synergy to occur and resulted in
mission success. Touchpoints like these exist throughout the HMA
and HFA enterprise but remain primarily stove piped within their
discipline. As an example, military EOD units work extensively
with HMA NGOs and have minimal interaction with DPAA, which

falls under the HFA umbrella. By fostering relationships between
disciplines, HMA and HFA can better synergize and benefit from
each other’s strengths.
More importantly, this case study highlights the challenges that
currently exist between the two disciplines. First, interdisciplinary touchpoints are lacking. As noted, communication within disciplines exists to a greater extent, but to create synergy with one
another, more consistent and lasting connections will be needed.
Second, operational knowledge of other organizations’ activities,
specifically cross-disciplinary, is minimal. Imagine if GWHF had
prior knowledge of the HFA NGO operating in the area and could
have precoordinated a human remains response package with
authorities already previously aligned.

Recommendations: The Foundation for Greatness
A first step to developing synergy
within these fields is to provide standardized, collaborative training. Locations
that possess a repository of EOD/HMA
knowledge and forensics science are a
logical first step to begin developing
opportunities for synergy. Oklahoma
State University is home to the Institute
for Global Explosive Hazard Mitigation
and the School of Forensic Science,
both nested under the Center for Health
Sciences. The requisite knowledge to blend
these two skills resides here and presents
a golden opportunity for practitioners
to come together to train and exchange
skills to succeed in a challenging job and
environment. In this setting, EOD/HMA History Flight recovering human
operators can learn foundational skills to remains from the site.
manage dead bodies and human remains Image courtesy of GWHF.
while conducting explosive hazard mitiA second step is to leverage current touchpoints between the
gation operations from knowledgeable faculty and forensic specialist practitioners in the course. This could include actions to be HMA and HFA fields and establish new interdisciplinary contacts
taken when remains are discovered, the ethical norms and legal to develop operational networks that can communicate and interstandards and due respect to managing the dead, and how best to operate. A central repository of knowledge and training, as noted
previously, would significantly accelerate, grow, and strengthen
assist forensic technicians in the field.
Forensic scientists can also be taught the hazards and associated the network and enable synergy. Habitual and consistent relationsafeties when working with or near explosives. This can include ships by enduring organizations, notably embedded NGOs, could
how to identify explosive threats, remain safe in an explosive envi- act as the glue needed to create networks and provide credibility
ronment, and “mark and bypass” these threats as not to limit the with host nations. It is essential when working with host nations to
overall HFA mission. This kind of subject-matter expert exchange have credible relations that have been established over an extended
would be crucial to understanding each other’s tactics, techniques, period and through repeated iterations of training or operations.
and procedures—ultimately reducing the time of HMA and HFA This is especially true if conducting cross-disciplinary engageoperations. A direct affiliation with academia will also provide ments. In a post-conflict environment where the local population
innovative solutions for HMA and HFA organizations to produce is grieving losses and looking for answers about their loved ones,
they may not be receptive to HMA organizations that could be
greater results.
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Human remains discovered, covered, and
cordoned during ERW excavation of the site.
Image courtesy of GWHF.

perceived to be associated with military forces. Suppose an HFA
organization had access and placement to this area and already
established solid and credible relationships. In that case, the local
population could be more accepting of the HMA organizations,
allowing them to conduct their operations and ultimately reduce
additional suffering.
This is not to say a centralized organization needs to be created
and would be tasking all HFA and HMA operations. Combined
task forces would be a unity of effort within the HMA and HFA
disciplines to utilize the networks established to solve complex
problems in challenging environments. Significant hurdles exist to

include resourcing and authorities. However, as demonstrated in
the Kiribati case study, solutions—such as coordinating with the
authority to continue work after the discovery of human remains
and identifying how best to make continued progress at HMA and
HFA sites—can be reached to achieve mission success. This is also a
total understanding of the capabilities others possess to best fit the
specified mission. One major consideration is the access and placement that so many HMA and HFA organizations already have.
Leveraging the network could alleviate considerable operational
constraints and restraints through another entity’s knowledge of
the operating environment.

Conclusion
Though HMA and HFA are separate disciplines, their spheres
of operations overlap and share many of the same humanitarian
goals. Despite the challenges, existing synergy provides a solid
foothold for new opportunities for collaboration, which are readily
available and ripe for action. Working together will keep HMA and
HFA specialists safe and within ethical and legal bounds, ensuring greater and more efficient successes in achieving desired outcomes. However, cooperation between HFA and HMA can only be
achieved if fostered and developed. Opportunities for networking,

cross-training, and interoperating should be paramount for both
disciplines. Ultimately, developing collaboration between these
two disciplines creates a framework for interoperability between
all humanitarian action groups. Opportunities already exist with
disciplines such as forensic anthropology and archeology at historical or sacred sites.7 This is only the beginning, and who knows
what additional opportunities for synergy will arise.
See endnotes page 72
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MINE ACTION AND THE REINTEGRATION
OF FORMER COMBATANTS:

Expanding the Debate

By Laurie Druelle [ Independent ], Henrique Garbino [ Swedish Defence University ] and Eric Mellado
Åhlin [ Independent ] ¹

I

n the last decades, humanitarian mine action (HMA) and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR)² processes have increasingly been recognized as essential to paving the way for sustainable development thanks to their contributions towards human security, livelihood, and access
to services. The integration between the two processes, however, has not yet been fully addressed
in the literature or practice. This paper seeks to identify areas where DDR and HMA intersect and,
supported by anecdotal evidence, suggest a theoretical framework for future research and implementation. Most importantly, we hope to widen the debate on the potentially synergic relationship
between HMA and DDR, flag possible fallacies or oversimplifications, and challenge solely “top-down”
approaches.

Several institutions recognize the potential of the integration of HMA and DDR in contributing to broader peace and security objectives. Perhaps one of the earliest references comes from the Bad Honnef Framework in 1999, which explicitly stated that "mine action
programs are part of peacebuilding programs. […], they should take into consideration the need for fully reintegrating refugees, displaced
persons, and demobilized soldiers."3 A report from the United Nations Development Programme highlights that:

[…] ex-combatants can make good deminers, and that involving them in clearance operations can be
a good interim arrangement on the road to reintegration into their communities and the local economy.
Mine clearance situates ex-combatants in civilian life, but in a professional culture, with good remuneration and an opportunity for training in areas that can help them make the full transition to sustainable livelihoods. The participation of ex-combatants in demining operations can also help restore trust
between former combatants and the community.4
However, while both processes aim at reducing armed violence and the impact of weapon contamination5 on human life, the link
between HMA and DDR has not been explored sufficiently in the literature or practice. Indeed, recruitment of ex-combatants into mine
action remains largely ad hoc and without clear “input to impact” correlation. The same observation can be made on the extent to which
HMA genuinely contributes to DDR and other peace-building activities.

Mine Action and DDR: Synergies in Goals and Principles
In this paper, we regard DDR as a process through which former combatants, independently or as groups, voluntarily lay down
their arms, break away from military command and control structures, and sustainably reintegrate as civilians in communities of
their choice.6 In a traditional view of DDR, disarmament is primarily aimed at the weapons held by combatants, normally excluding humanitarian demining, explosive ordnance risk education
(EORE), victim assistance, and advocacy from the DDR realm.
However, the similarities between mine action programs and DDR
processes are apparent:
• Both processes contribute to a decreased availability of
weapons and munitions and are thus key in contributing
to the security and de-militarization of society.7
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•

•

•

The return of productive areas advances the return
to normalcy in terms of economic development and postconflict reconstruction.8 Likewise, the reintegration of former combatants into formal employment can stimulate the
local economy.9
The work environment where demining often takes place, the
organizational structures of many demining organizations,
and many of the required skills for demining often resemble
those of the military practice. Thus, the change from combatant to deminer does not represent much discontinuity for the combatant, facilitating a transition process.
And, at last, the importance of community participation, engagement, and buy-in is central to both processes.10

Jefferson Martinez, from FARC-EP, points out to members of the Colombian military’s
Humanitarian Demining Brigade an area where they might find more landmines in a minefield in
Antioquia, Colombia.
Image courtesy of Norwegian People's Aid/Giovanni Diffidenti.

Interestingly, the two processes have been described as being at
the core of the humanitarian-development-peace (HDP) nexus.
Alexander Zouev, UN Assistant Secretary-General for Rule of Law
and Security Institutions, referred to mine action as "a vital element of the nexus between peace and security and development,
and a cornerstone in preventing any relapse into future conflicts."11
Similarly, sustainable DDR processes are dependent on humanitarian and development programs, including demining initiatives,

long-term development, and reform that address the root causes of
the conflict and an improved security situation.12
In this light, closer linkages and strengthened synergies between
HMA and DDR can, beyond their intrinsic value, be of benefit to
the HDP nexus as a whole. The following subsections present an
initial reflection on how this relationship potentially contributes
to physical and human security, confidence building, employment,
and community support.

Physical and Human Security
As increasingly recognized by several HMA donors, local-level
human security13 should remain an essential outcome of HMA programming.14 It is also a key factor for DDR processes as a whole,
particularly for sustainable reintegration. Security-related threats
posed by armed forces, non-state armed groups, and criminal
gangs are customarily addressed through disarmament and demobilization efforts, other initiatives aiming to reduce violence at the
community level,15 stabilization efforts, and strengthening the rule
of law. However, none of these initiatives address the security risks
posed by landmines and explosive ordnance (EO). Different from
the threat posed by small arms and light weapons, landmines and
EO effectively deny community members access to productive land
and vital infrastructure. Additionally, they stress local and often

weak health structures through indiscriminate victimization and
magnify related obstacles, preventing individuals from economic
engagement and social participation in their communities.16
Furthermore, mines are often perceived as illegitimate weapons
or invisible enemies that attack people without distinction and
cause death or suffering for life, generating fear and resentment
among the population, and enhancing collective trauma. As such,
the clearance of mines has an intrinsic, symbolic value as it can
represent the end of an otherwise endless anguish and protracted
insecurity.17 Mine clearance can thus assist reintegration processes
by contributing to the general sense of security at the community
level, easing the traumas of conflict, and marking a symbolic milestone in conflict-to-peace transitions.
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Confidence Building
The success of peace processes in general, and of DDR in particular, is dependent on the parties' buy-in to the process. However,
individuals' and groups' commitment to these processes may be
negatively affected by a lack of perceived or actual momentum, putting previously-made progress at risk. The clearance of landmines
and other EO is an area where early agreement can be reached
between conflicting parties, thereby presenting an opportunity for
adversaries to credibly commit to a peace process and increase confidence.8 For example, in the aftermath of the Ecuadorian–Peruvian
War19 or, more recently, in Colombia 20 and the Korean Peninsula, 21
humanitarian demining has been used to build trust between
former or current enemy militaries. Moreover, in Colombia, 22 Sri
Lanka, 23 Sudan, 24 and Central America, 25 community trust in former combatants was enhanced through humanitarian demining.
Once implementation starts, mine clearance can deliver tangible and concrete results relatively quickly, such as enabling
the return of schools, hospitals, and productive areas to affected
communities.26 Removing mines can thus bring much-needed
momentum and public support to peace and reconciliation processes, transitional justice, and long-term development. In turn,
these developments may be decisive motivating factors for former
combatants to seriously commit to reintegration and for members
of the recipient communities to accept the returning combatants
and their associates.

In addition, access to productive land is central to most reintegration processes. As such, land dispute or animosity caused over
the initial contamination of the land might spark distrust and a
general feeling of betrayal among combatants and communities
alike and, in turn, incentivize recidivism.
Mine action initiatives also provide examples of the potential
role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as mediators
between government authorities and former combatants. On 7
March 2015, before the signature of the peace agreement, representatives of the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia – People's Army (FARC-EP) signed the socalled "Demining Agreement."27 The agreement established a joint
humanitarian demining project financed by the European Union
(EU) and included the clearance of two hazardous areas. The project consisted of mixed technical teams from the Colombian Army
and FARC-EP, coordinated and verified by Norwegian People's Aid
(NPA).28 In addition, NPA acted as an independent, neutral, and
impartial mediator and facilitator between the Colombian military
and FARC-EP guerrilla fighters. The project was finally considered
to have helped recover public confidence in the peace process and
de-escalate the armed conflict, 29 strengthening ties between the
public forces and the FARC-EP and promoting a mediating role
of NGOs between the signatories of the agreement.30 Similar solutions may be found in implementing integrated mine action and
DDR projects.

Employment
Employment is commonly referred to as a mechanism that can
mutually strengthen HMA and DDR. 31 Mine action programs
often provide several direct and indirect employment opportunities to conflict-affected communities. Intuitively, former combatants can bring significant contributions to mine action efforts,
especially to its humanitarian demining pillar. It is not surprising then that many mine action organizations regularly employ
former combatants in their country programs. Former combatants might have significant knowledge of the location of minefields, battle areas, and even ammunition caches and deposits. 32
They can thus contribute to the identification of hazardous areas
in non-technical surveys (NTS). 33 Moreover, improvised explosive
devices (IEDs) vary widely in design, technology, trigger mechanisms, components, and explosive yield, and former combatants'
technical expertise and insights could be beneficial in conflicts
with their widespread use. Accordingly, NPA experienced a considerable increase in efficiency using former combatants as guides
in NTS for a pilot project in Colombia, from 1,500 to 400 sq m of
cleared land for each mine or EO found. 34
Humanitarian demining also reflects, to a large extent, the
dynamics to which former combatants were accustomed during the conflict. HMA builds on hierarchical and disciplined
structures working in challenging environments and managing
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potentially lethal EO. 35 Apart from the familiarity with a hierarchical structure and adaptability to extreme environmental conditions (such as jungles, deserts, and mountains), many skills of
former combatants are advantageous for demining work and are
in high demand by demining organizations. For example, knowledge in EO recognition and safe handling of explosives, safety precautions, first aid, and cartographic techniques are basic military
skills that are crucial to clearance activities. 36
Former combatants that belong to communities affected by
conf lict may have a greater insight into, and access to, at-risk
populations than what government and international actors
do. This dynamic is further enhanced in regions where rebel
groups were the de facto authorities or where civilians were
victimized mainly by government actors. In turn, this proximity with the population becomes an advantage in gathering
information during NTS, EORE activities, 37 and community
liaison, which is present throughout the land release process. 38
The recruitment of former combatants by The HALO Trust
(HALO) in Afghanistan, for example, allowed contact with
previously inaccessible communities. HALO's program also
benefited from the former combatants' technical and strategic
knowledge and experience working in extreme environmental
conditions. 39

In a recent survey, virtually all former combatants working for HALO in Colombia reported personal satisfaction and
increased living standards after joining the mine action organization. However, they valued the applicability of their previous
experience as combatants to their new role as deminers differently. While some acknowledged the benefits of having worked
with explosives and the know-how of living in the jungle and
mountains, others deemed their previous experience as "totally
useless" for clearance work.40 This highlights the need for proper
training and accreditation of those engaging in demining initiatives, especially given that many members of armed groups fill
supporting roles, such as informers or cooks, and therefore have
less experience with explosives.
For former combatants, joining a mine action organization
offers, above all, a dignified profession—besides not requiring
formal education—with a good and sustainable income that is
often respected by the community.41 In addition, it provides an
opportunity to use their military knowledge while at the same
time committing themselves to a positive and visible effort for

affected communities and society at large.42 The change from
combatant to deminer does not represent much discontinuity for the combatant while still forwarding the demobilization
and reintegration processes and making them work for and with
civilians.43 Engaging in humanitarian demining thus becomes a
way for former combatants to overcome some hurdles preventing
their reintegration.
In Afghanistan, former combatants were twice included in
mine action programs, namely from 2004 to 2006, in the Mine
Action for Peace (MAFP) project under the DDR process for progovernment militias partaking in the conflict against the Taliban;
and the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP)
from 2010 to 2016.44 Both projects presented positive results
regarding the acceptance of former combatants by the affected
communities and the personal and professional satisfaction of the
demobilized combatants.45 The retention rate among demobilized
personnel in the mine action sector was 70 percent in 2012, without
any of them having returned to the conflict.46

Community Support
Sustainable reintegration builds on the ability of former combatants to reintegrate as civilians, but it also requires a community that is receptive and able to absorb former combatants and
their associates. Put differently, there has to be a community into
which former combatants can reintegrate. In community-based
reintegration, support is often directed towards communities with
a high prevalence of former combatants. Thus, sustainable reintegration is facilitated through an enhanced socioeconomic and
political capacity of these communities.47
In this light, humanitarian demining can play an important
role in community-based reintegration. For instance, safe access

to land is a significant benefit for the affected communities. It lays
the foundation for agricultural development and employment,
access to markets and critical infrastructure, and eases the burden
of often stretched health systems. In addition, demining initiatives
offer community members employment opportunities, providing
essential economic injections that may transcend the community.
Taken together, demining initiatives are exceptionally well placed
to shape and connect former combatants and their associates with
the recipient communities in which they reintegrate.

HMA as a Vector for DDR, but at What Cost?
As highlighted previously, some positive outcomes can be
expected from better integration of DDR and HMA processes.
However, capitalizing on these synergies without an adequate
understanding of the complex environments and local power
dynamics within which they are implemented can lead to more
harm than good.
First, while most mine action operators put their humanitarian nature at the forefront, DDR processes are inherently political. For HMA operators to participate in, or be a component of, a
DDR process could significantly challenge their impartiality
and independence as they could be perceived as implementing the “winner's peace.” Furthermore, in mine action programs
carried out or led by statutory military forces, the inclusion of former combatants from rebel movements may face resistance due to
widespread distrust on both sides. On top of the usual operational
risks related to HMA or DDR processes, these added components
could fuel tensions further and amount to security concerns to

the organizations, their staff, and the communities they are seeking to support.
Second, the employment of former combatants can create the
perception of injustice for benefiting them with sustainable jobs
while the population continues to suffer the consequences of the
conflict. This perception is reinforced by the narrative of former
combatants first having planted the mines and then being paid to
remove them. A similar perception occurred in South Africa in the
1990s when companies producing anti-personnel mines began to
work with humanitarian demining.48
Third, integrating former combatants into mine action could also
come at the expense of other members of the local society.
At a time when mine action operators dedicate many resources to
improve gender balance in their teams, the employment of primarily
male former combatants in demining initiatives includes significant
risk of reinforcing gender inequalities. HMA organizations should
remain accountable to the local population they seek to assist and
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Former FARC-EP combatants specialized in manual clearance technique and medical support of
HUMANICEMOS DH, trained in December, 2020.
Image courtesy of UNMAS Colombia and HUMANICEMOS DH.

inform their recruitment processes based on thorough assessments of
local power dynamics; different gender, age, and diversity needs; and
barriers to access. This would ensure that no harm is done in awarding comparatively higher income to some sub-groups of the society.
To avoid worsening disbalance in power dynamics, operators could
dedicate efforts to connect their work with humanitarian and development actors so that members of the society who will not benefit
from employment opportunities or land release are also supported.
Finally, another challenge identified in closer DDR-HMA integration is funding. On the one hand, there is pressure for comprehensive programs that integrate both mine action49 and DDR 50
into the HDP nexus. As such, a single project that works simultaneously with both issues could increase the cost-benefit ratio perception to prospective donors. For these reasons, we assume that
the international community and donors would receive the proposal for an integrated HMA-DDR program well. For instance, in
Afghanistan, HALO's integrated project under the APRP gained
interest and support from donors such as Japan and Germany. 51
Similarly and most recently in Colombia, HUMANICEMOS
DH52—the first and only mine action organization established,
staffed, and run solely by former combatants—received plenty of
donor attention, especially from the EU and the UN–managed,
multi-donor trust funds. 53 However, while some donors might be
willing to support former combatants, others might face political,
financial, and legal barriers for doing so.
The Colombian case again provides an interesting example.
The EU and the UN are the main donors for HUMANICEMOS
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DH, which employs only former FARC-EP combatants. In contrast with other donors, until recently, the United States had been
unable to fund any project where former FARC-EP combatants
took part. In turn, this led to a significant obstacle for the organization, whose demining operations were stalled until October
2020. 54 The mine action accreditation authority in Colombia, the
Organization of American States' (OAS) mine action program, is
mainly funded by the United States and could not accredit former combatants for demining tasks. 55 The solution was to delegate the responsibility for accreditation and quality management
of HUMANICEMOS DH to the United Nations Mine Action
Service (UNMAS) in Colombia. 56 Following this arrangement,
HUMANICEMOS DH became operational in October 2020 and
has not stopped since. They even delivered their first mine-free
area in October 2021. In November 2021, in the framework of
the fifth anniversary of the Peace Accord, the United States
removed the FARC-EP from the list of terrorist organizations,
which allows HUMANICEMOS DH to be considered for technical assistance and resources from the United States and other
international organizations such as the OAS. 57
This serves as an illustrative example of the political complexities of joining the nodes of the HMA-DDR nexus, especially within
the funding realm. Once again, underlining how the intersection
between these two fields—despite being closely related—is far from
clear cut. However, overcoming these challenges has great potential, as stated in a recent UNMAS report:

HUMANICEMOS DH as an organization has made reintegration possible through mine action in Colombia and
as a consequence, it is expected that there will be effective actions of reparation with the communities affected
by the armed conflict. The Humanicemos Reintegration Project shows that the main contribution of mine action
to effective collective and individual reintegration is the professional and personal work-related development of
the ex-combatants. The Project has fostered decent employment with reasonable salaries and benefits, formal
and informal training courses, and, to a lesser extent, treatment of the psychosocial issues of ex-combatants, from
a holistic approach. In this way, the ex-combatants currently linked to the Project as well as those ex-participants
that were previously trained and employed in the sector have been discouraged from re-joining armed groups by
relying on the skills, technical tools and legitimate resources in their transition and continuance in civilian life.58

Conclusion
Throughout this article, we discussed the nexus between
two fundamental processes at the core of the humanitariandevelopment-peacebuilding nexus: HMA and DDR. We highlighted possible pathways through which an integrated approach
could benefit the nexus at large as well as mine action and DDR
processes in particular. We have also discussed the challenges and
identified possible solutions. In doing so, we aimed to contribute
to a theoretical framework that, we hope, may be helpful for future
research and to widen the debate on this still underexplored facet
of conflict and post-conflict environments.
We encourage future research and cooperation between stakeholders, from think tanks and academia to government bodies and international organizations to NGOs and civil society

organizations. In particular, we encourage operators to continue
documenting their work on the matter, not solely quantitatively
but also qualitatively and at the outcome level, including adverse
and unforeseen ripple effects on local power dynamics induced
from the employment of former combatants in mine action programs. We also encourage donors to continue to play a role in keeping their partners accountable and challenge oversimplifications,
for example, that employment equals development. Finally, all
external actors working along with the HDP nexus are responsible
to maintain a people-first approach and a light footprint on local
dynamics.
See endnotes page 72
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MINE ACTION IN AFGHANISTAN
AND TAJIKISTAN:

Challenges and Opportunities
By Markus Schindler [ Swiss Foundation for Mine Action ]

R

ugged mountains, challenging road conditions, ongoing security concerns, and a fluctuating
donor landscape present a wide range of obstacles to mine clearance efforts in Afghanistan
and neighboring Tajikistan. The Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) first entered the region
in 2001 in the wake of the US-led invasion of Afghanistan. Since then, the mine action sectors in both
countries have seen significant progress and growth. FSD has been part of this process since its early
days through its country programs in Tajikistan and Afghanistan, engaging in a variety of mine action
activities including clearance (manual, mechanical, and with mine detection dogs [MDD]), risk education, stockpile destruction, and victim assistance. This article describes the contexts of both countries’
contamination and the ways in which mine action has been applied to mitigate the impact of explosive
ordnance (EO). The article also explores the obstacles and challenges that mine action organizations
face in Afghanistan and Tajikistan, respectively, and describes how they can be overcome.
Afghanistan and Tajikistan share as many commonalities as
they are divided by differences. The countries’ histories are intertwined yet unfolded along very different lines. The territories of
both countries were contaminated with mines during the SovietAfghan War in the 1980s, and both countries experienced subsequent civil wars during the 1990s that added to the contamination.
Yet while Tajikistan found relative stability by the end of the 1990s,
Afghanistan continued to be engulfed in seemingly endless wars
and presently looks ahead to an uncertain future.
FSD began working in Afghanistan in 2001. Ten mine action
emergency response teams and a planning and coordination unit
were deployed and integrated into the World Food Programme’s
(WFP) special operation for Afghanistan. During this time, FSD
also began with the assessment of Tajikistan’s EO contamination, and in 2003 signed an agreement with the Organization
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) for the first
internationally-supported mine action program in Tajikistan.

Tajikistan
Tajikistan is a landlocked country in Central Asia. Mountains
cover 93 percent of its territory,1 and about half of the country is
over 3,000 meters (9,800 ft) above sea level, lending particular significance to the flat and arable areas in its southwest and north.
Over 72 percent of Tajikistan’s population live in rural districts,2
and farming is a key economic factor in one of Central Asia’s poorest countries. Gaining independence after the dissolution of the
Soviet Union, Tajikistan went through a decade of upheaval during
the 1990s. Three conflicts occurred during this time that left the
country contaminated with mines and other types of EO:
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MDD team clearing hazardous areas in Tajikistan.
All images courtesy of the author/FSD.

FSD manual clearance team descending from a hazardous area in Badakhshan, Afghanistan.
1. Between 1992 and 1998, the Russian army laid mines along
Tajikistan’s southern border with Afghanistan.3
2. Between 1992 and 1997, Tajikistan suffered the most severe
civil war among the conflicts that erupted throughout
the former Soviet Union after it collapsed in 1990/1991.4
Landmines were used throughout the civil war, especially
in central Tajikistan; moreover, the five-year conflict left the
country contaminated with unexploded ordnance (UXO).
3. Between 1999 and 2001, areas along Tajikistan’s borders to
the east and north were mined during conflicts with neighboring Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.5
Sections of the borders as well as many minefields between
Tajikistan and its neighboring countries are not yet fully defined6
and marked, putting the civilian population at a high risk. Mine
accidents have taken a heavy toll among civilians and livestock.
However, many accidents still go unreported due to the extreme
isolation of the affected regions and the lack of medical facilities.
Tajikistan is one of the 164 parties to the Anti-Personnel Mine
Ban Treaty7 and in 2003 formed the Tajik National Mine Action
Center (TNMAC) to oversee the implementation of the country’s
treaty obligations. FSD began operations in Tajikistan the same
year in support of the national authorities, conducting technical surveys (TS) and mine clearance operations. Since its inception, the program has undergone major transformations and has
accomplished important advancements towards the ultimate goal
of establishing sustainable, nationalized mine action capabilities
for Tajikistan. After nineteen years of continuous operations, the
Tajikistan program is FSD’s longest-running country program.
Since its first mission to Tajikistan, FSD has conducted assessments and surveys in order to provide a clear picture of the country’s contamination and to prepare its clearance operations. This

includes TS, non-technical survey (NTS), as well as socioeconomic
baseline and impact surveys. In its Tajikistan program, FSD has
deployed all standard land release/demining methodologies and
assets in common practice: manual demining teams, MDD teams,
mechanical demining teams, and survey/explosive ordnance risk
education (EORE) teams. In recent years, FSD’s focus has shifted to
supporting the Tajik authorities in safely destroying poorly stored
surplus weapons and ammunition (WAD), including Man Portable
Air Defense Systems (MANPADS).8
FSD’s early demining operations were primarily located in
Tajikistan’s western, mountainous Gorno-Badakhshan region, as
well as in its southern, agricultural Kathlon region. Until 2010, FSD
deployed its survey, manual clearance, and MDD teams primarily in areas contaminated during the 1992–1997 civil war. These
areas were often mountainous and difficult to access and operate
in, and affected by severe weather that resulted in relatively short

Demolition of MANPADS
from military stockpile,
Tajikistan, 2011.
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Mine clearance in northern Badakhshan, Afghanistan.
demining seasons. FSD has therefore put particular emphasis on
recruiting deminers locally to support affected communities but
also to benefit from local knowledge and increased access. Good
relations with local authorities have proven vital, as has the deployment of vehicles and equipment suitable for the harsh terrain.
By 2010, FSD had cleared most of the areas contaminated during
the Tajik civil war and shifted its focus to the clearance of mine
belts laid by former Soviet forces on the Tajik side of the TajikistanAfghanistan border. These areas, particularly those in the heavily mined western part of the border along the Amu Darya river,
contaminate parts of Tajikistan’s scarce, flat, and fertile land. For
this reason, FSD deployed two mechanical demining teams, each
equipped with a remote controlled MV4 mini flail. Also in 2010,
Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) joined FSD and became the second
humanitarian mine action (HMA) program in Tajikistan.

Unfortunately, funding levels for humanitarian demining
started to decline in the mid-2010s, and in 2018 FSD was forced to
cease demining operations in Tajikistan. This further impacted an
already underfunded mine action sector in Tajikistan, and contributed to the need for Tajikistan to request an additional extension
on their Mine Ban Treaty obligations under Article 5.
At the close, FSD had released more than 38 million square
meters of land—over 11 million square meters cleared and over
27 million square meters of suspected contaminated areas cancelled through survey. However, FSD continues WAD operations
in Tajikistan. Moreover, FSD has also developed a number of environmental remediation projects, socioeconomic and sociomedical
interventions, and capacity-building projects in Tajikistan and
neighboring Kyrgyzstan.

Afghanistan
More than for its rugged terrain and its cultural and linguistic
diversity, Afghanistan is best known for its tragic contemporary
history. Invasions and civil wars have held the country in their
grip for the past four decades and turned Afghanistan into one
of the countries most contaminated by mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW).
Much of the country’s explosive contamination originated
during the Soviet-Afghan War, throughout which large areas of
the countryside and border regions were mined. Afghanistan’s
civil war following the Soviet retreat added further contamination, and the violent struggle against the US-led coalition and
the Afghan government saw an increased use of improvised
explosive devices (IEDs).
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FSD initially deployed to Afghanistan in the wake of the
US-led invasion in 2001, setting up quick-reaction teams in the
major population centers to provide mine action assistance for
the WFP’s distribution to the civilian population. FSD’s tasks
included EORE for the staff of WFP and other humanitarian
organizations; inspecting and demining of WFP infrastructures
such as storage units, distribution sites, offices, and staff housing;
marking and mapping of hazard areas; training local mine action
organizations in techniques for treating and neutralizing weapons and EO; and destroying stocks of landmines and ammunition.
The Mine Action Emergency Response program was completed in
early 2003, and equipment was formally handed over to the Mine
Action Program for Afghanistan. Throughout the program, FSD
teams have destroyed more than 143,000 items of UXO.9

After a seven-year absence, FSD started
the first regional cross-border land
release project between Tajikistan and
Afghanistan in a difficult to access area
in Afghanistan’s Badakhshan Province
in 2010. Covered in snow-capped mountains, the remote northern districts of
Badakhshan are isolated from the rest of
the country by the Hindu Kush mountain
range. From a logistic point of view, it was
much easier to access this remote province via a cross-border operation from
Tajikistan to the north. FSD did so from an
operational office in Kalai Khumb on the
Tajik side of the Panj Valley.
As a border region with the Soviet
Union, the northern parts of Badakhshan
Province were heavily mined in order to
hamper Mujahideen attacks on Soviet
bases on both sides of the border. Soviet
forces primarily laid PMN-2 anti-personMechanical clearance with MV4 mini flail, Tajikistan.
nel (AP) mines as well as scatterable PFM-1
AP mines, which were often deployed from helicopters. These
Notably, the effects of these disabilities extend beyond the physiminefields continue to pose a severe threat to human life but also cal. Due to their injuries and the lack of environmental adaptions
to cross-border economic, social, and cultural exchange.
available, many mine survivors are at risk to become effectively
Through lobbying efforts by FSD, the governments of ostracized from the local community and find it difficult to conAfghanistan and Tajikistan signed a landmark international agree- tribute due to stigma and discrimination. This in turn compounds
ment for cross-border cooperation on mine action activities. As a the burden of many of the survivors, who are often already strugresult, TNMAC rather than the Afghan Mine Action Authority gling with the psychological trauma resulting from their injuries.
provided quality management (QM) for FSD’s work in Badakhshan
In order to address this, FSD is developing a number of assisProvince due to the area’s inaccessibility from the Afghan side. tance projects for mine survivors. The first of these efforts started
However, the border closure in 2021 as a result of the political in March 2020 with a small-scale facilitation project that aims to
changes in Afghanistan has brought an end to this arrangement.10
facilitate travel and accommodation for survivors who require
FSD’s work in Afghanistan covers key aspects of mine action; support as identified during FSD’s interviews. Mine survivors are
several demining teams conduct mine clearance and battle area given assistance with transport and accommodation to enable their
clearance (BAC). Since 2011, FSD’s teams have cleared over 2.24 attendance at a specialist clinic run by the International Committee
million square meters of minefields and
PFM1 AP mines found in Badakhshan, Afghanistan.
nearly 440,000 square meters of former
battlefields. In the process, they destroyed
almost 32,000 AP mines and 12,400 UXO.
FSD also deploys a number of teams that
conduct NTS and EORE for affected populations. Moreover, since 2018, FSD has
also taken advantage of its presence in
local communities to interview and support survivors of mine accidents. Many
of the survivors have already received
medical care, but their daily lives are still
heavily impacted by their disabilities, an
additional factor of vulnerability in this
poor and isolated region. From 2019 to
2020, FSD assessed the needs of around
100 survivors.
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FSD EORE team leader conducts risk education at a girls’ school in Badakhshan, Afghanistan.
of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Faizabad. The ICRC assesses the survivors and, where needed, provides updated prosthetics or orthotics.
This project has a minimal outlay in terms of capital and resources
but can make a significant difference to the lives of survivors who
could not otherwise afford the trip. FSD helped sixteen people from
remote villages in Badakhshan Province to make the journey to
Faizabad and receive support in 2021, and is expanding this effort
in 2022 to other areas in northern Afghanistan.
This expansion will also aim to promote the socioeconomic
reintegration of mine survivors and to enable them to better provide for their families once again. In doing so, the projects also
seek to foster the psychosocial well-being of survivors. Projects
include upgrading the accessibility and occupational health needs
of survivors both in their own homes and in the wider community.
Support provided could be as simple as providing a step-free access
to areas or adapting furniture. Other projects will look to provide
training and support to provide local employment for survivors.
FSD will seek to ensure this effort is provided under a do-no-harm
framework and as such is in the process of surveying the economies of local villages in Badakhshan Province.11 This will ensure
that complementary and sustainable opportunities are created and
balanced across the region.
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Despite challenges, FSD remains operational in Afghanistan and
has opened a new office in Kunduz. However, work in Afghanistan
in the wake of the Taliban takeover has required adaption and careful assessment to ensure that staff can work safely. As discussed
earlier in this article, in Tajikistan, one of the key facilitators for
acceptance remains the relationships FSD has developed within
local communities, especially with key gatekeepers such as village elders. Local Taliban leaders have had no objection to FSD
continuing its work in Badakhshan but have requested that FSD
coordinates and negotiates their plans with the local elders. FSD’s
long involvement in Afghanistan and our proactive local staff have
ensured that work can continue by maintaining these village level
relationships, thus creating a permissive environment.
The challenges of operating in Afghanistan’s mountainous north
are abundant. The ruggedness of the terrain and the poor road conditions result in slow movement. To reduce the risk of accidents and
vehicle breakdowns, FSD deploys suitable four-wheel drive vehicles
from regionally popular manufacturers to ensure the availability of
spare parts. Moreover, many hazard areas in Badakhshan’s rugged
north are located on steep slopes, while others are on valley floors
and river banks. As a result, clearance rates can vary starkly between
hazard areas. In addition, demining activities are suspended every

year during the winter months until the snow melts. Deminers use
this period to go home for some leave, to prepare their equipment,
and to review demining procedures before the restart of operations
in the new year.12
The security situation in northern Afghanistan has undergone
numerous changes since FSD began operations there in 2011.
Fighting between government and anti-government forces flared
up regularly, and the control of areas shifted at times. Through
constant monitoring, community engagement, and a high level
of adaptability, FSD’s Afghanistan team was able to cope with
these security challenges, save for a number of brief stand-downs.
All teams are recruited locally, helping FSD staff to ensure close
coordination and cordial relations with local authorities and community leaders. FSD’s teams in Afghanistan have continued this
practice following the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan in 2021,
affording the teams relative freedom of movement with no security
incidents occurring.
Cross-border projects bring a very particular set of challenges.
Afghanistan’s border with Tajikistan is demarcated by rivers; crossing it was only possible via the few bridges that connect the two
countries. However, the past two years have seen significant border closures. During the onset of the Coronavirus pandemic, the
border was closed, and FSD’s Afghan teams were unable to receive
demining equipment from its base in Tajikistan. Only lobbying
and political intervention eventually brought a solution, when FSD
staff based in Tajikistan was allowed to move vehicles and equipment from the regional headquarters (HQ) in Dushanbe and the
operational HQ in Kalai Khumb to the border crossing at Jamarj-e
Bala. A dozen vehicles with demining and hygiene equipment were
transferred to the border crossing, where they were allowed to be
driven onto the border bridge. The Tajik drivers then disinfected
and left the vehicles and returned to Tajik soil, while FSD’s Afghan
drivers walked onto the bridge from the other side to take over the
vehicles and to drive them into Afghanistan.
Another key challenge FSD experiences in Afghanistan’s remote
north relates to gender, specifically the employment of women.

Socioeconomic impact assessment—trees
cut by locals on land that was cleared and
handed over by FSD.
Local culture prescribes strict gender roles, and the employment of women is often regarded as problematic. However, FSD
was keen to ensure access to female mine survivors as part of the
victim assistance project. To solve this problem, FSD hired four
mixed teams, each consisting of a husband and wife. This way all
teams were able to travel and access mine survivors regardless of
their gender. Unfortunately, following last year’s political changes
in Afghanistan, the local village elders asked FSD not to employ
female staff and to cease the delivery of EORE to girls over the age
of twelve. Whether this was a directive from the region’s new rulers, “preemptive obedience” on the part of the community leaders,
or the local preference in accordance with the cultural norms in
these remote areas is difficult to determine. While this is a regrettable development from FSD’s perspective, it is equally important
to ensure the safety of all FSD staff in Afghanistan, including the
safety of female staff.
As the political situation in Afghanistan has somewhat stabilized, FSD is eager to approach this matter again and to petition local authorities for permission to re-deploy female teams.
However, the issue is very sensitive and, even if possible in principle, it may not yet be feasible in practice due to potential security
risks for female staff.

Conclusion
Southern Central Asia is a region beset by many challenges.
Natural obstacles such as the region’s rough terrain and harsh
climate are compounded by various political issues and security
concerns, particularly in Afghanistan. While suitable and wellmaintained equipment is a crucial factor to success, the most
important asset for any mine action organization operating in
Afghanistan and Tajikistan is the trust and endorsement of local
communities. A supportive population and eager local authorities
are not only vital for access to potential hazard areas, affected people, and mine survivors, they’re also indispensable for the security
of an organization’s staff.
See endnotes page 73
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TNMAC’S VICTIM ASSISTANCE ACTIVITIES:

The Mental Health Aspect of
Survivors and HMA Personnel
By Reykhan Muminova, MD, PhD, and Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, PhD
[ Tajikistan National Mine Action Center ]

T

ajikistan, a State Party to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) since 1 April 2000,
contains a significant number of landmine victims and survivors. The Tajikistan National Mine
Action Center (TNMAC) is using the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA)
Core for its data collection and reporting, including information on persons killed or injured by mines
as well as their needs and challenges. This information is disaggregated by gender, age, and disability.
Since 1992, the total number of casualties resulting from accidents with landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) is 885 (535 survivors; 350 fatalities).
In accordance with Article 6.3 of the APMBC, Tajikistan
is responsible for looking after its own landmine victims. The
Convention states that “each State Party in a position to do so shall
provide assistance for the care and rehabilitation, and social and
economic reintegration, of landmine victims.”1 Action 38 of the
Oslo Action Plan clarifies that each State Party should “Take steps
to ensure that, taking into account local, national and regional circumstances, all mine victims, including in rural and remote areas,
have access to comprehensive rehabilitation services and psychological and psychosocial support services, including through the
provision of outreach rehabilitation service, where necessary, while
paying particular attention to the most vulnerable.”2
Since the Tajikistan Mine Action Programme (TMAP) began,
psychosocial rehabilitation has been recognized as a critical component of its victim assistance (VA) initiatives due to how most
landmine survivors show symptoms of chronic post-traumatic
stress disorder (PTSD). Namely, survivors often have reduced emotional well-being due to depression, anxiety, fear, anger, dependence on others, and isolation due to feelings of shame, guilt, and
discrimination.
While landmine survivors with critical incident stress (CIS),3 a
common response to an abnormal event (e.g., a landmine explosion), are provided for by traditional medical care in Tajikistan,
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most survivors of landmine accidents have delayed reactions to
CIS. Additionally, survivors often do not receive psychological first
aid (PFA) and psychosocial rehabilitation. As in many other postconflict countries, rural hospitals and clinics close to the mineaffected areas in Tajikistan do not have specialists in psychological
support that could provide PFA to landmine survivors and families
of survivors. Additionally, Tajikistan does not have existing peerto-peer support groups.
After conducting a needs assessment survey, TMAP and its
partners developed a number of projects aimed to provide direct
support to landmine survivors through individual counselling sessions and summer rehabilitation workshops. These projects aim to
(a) build the capacity of landmine survivors to support each other
via peer-to-peer support programs; (b) strengthen the capacity of
humanitarian mine action (HMA) paramedics and medical staff
working in mine-affected districts to provide PFA to landmine
survivors and other persons who underwent amputations; and (c)
exchange experiences with regional colleagues and experts working in these fields through participation in relevant conferences
and trainings.
During the COVID-19 pandemic, sessions on the psychosocial
effects of the pandemic were conducted for members of the Victim
Assistance Technical Working Group (VA TWG) and paramedics

Summer rehabilitation workshop in Bahoriston sanatorium, Tajikistan, 2016.
Image courtesy of sanatorium Bahoriston personnel.

working for HMA organizations in Tajikistan (Swiss Foundation
for Mine action [FSD], Ministry of Defence [MoD], and Norwegian
People’s Aid [NPA]). The sessions worked to build participants’

resilience in managing emergencies and stressful life events for
all HMA workers, a necessary element toward addressing psychosocial issues and strengthening mental health.

TNMAC Summer Rehabilitation Workshops
Since 2005, TNMAC and its partners4 have organized summer
rehabilitation workshops to provide psychological and physiological rehabilitation, trainings, and advocacy support to landmine
survivors as well as to raise public awareness of VA activities. Since
its inception, more than 750 landmine survivors have benefitted
from the workshops. The summer workshops improve survivors’
general health by bringing together physiotherapy and adaptive
sports in a supportive atmosphere to enhance participants’ communication and social-integration skills. The workshops also
provide psychological rehabilitation for participants through
mindfulness, art therapy, and individual/group psychological
sessions under the supervision of professional psychologists and

artists,5 which improves self-confidence and self-esteem among
survivors. As an evidence-based treatment, trauma-focused cognitive-behavioral therapy for PTSD is used during individual sessions. It includes psychoeducation, memory restructuring, and
narrative exposure therapy approaches, transforms survivors’
core negative beliefs, and teaches survivors techniques on how to
regulate their emotions.
Survivors who attend the camps are surprised by the positive
effects of the art therapy, which helps to reduce their aggression, anxiety, and fatigue, giving them a more positive outlet for
their negative emotions. Additionally, survivors find that the
therapy improves their creativity, self-expression, overall mood,

“[The] summer rehabilitation workshop gave me new inspiration for … life because I met with other survivors
and understand that I am not alone. By socializing with other survivors, I regained my confidence and positive
outlook. I get treatment and physiotherapy … [which] improved my health status. With [the] support of professional psychologists, art-therapists, and trainers I received knowledge on our rights and many other necessary
information and skills. All this helped me to become [an] active member of society in general and in victim assistance … Now I am advocating for disability rights, Oslo Action Plan, and for ratification of UNCRPD in Tajikistan. I
am very grateful to Tajikistan National Mine Action Center and donors who are supporting TMAP.”
~ Sadafmo Davlatova, landmine survivor from Dashtijum Village, Shamsiddin Shohin district.
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and communication skills. Team-building skills also improve
through sports participation. As survivors see themselves growing stronger physically, they gain self-confidence and are motivated to become more self-reliant.
The results of art therapy and sports rehabilitation show that
recovery is not just about regaining physical function—it is also
about recovering from trauma emotionally and spiritually. With
this holistic approach to rehabilitation, survivors can better understand who they are and how they fit within society. They become

contributing members and no longer allow feelings of self-pity and
loneliness to dictate their self-image.
Since 2014, summer rehabilitation workshops have been modified to include more training and advocacy components.6 This new
format aims to further increase the skills and knowledge of mine
survivors through training on leadership, team building, the independent living philosophy,7 human rights, and disability rights,
including national and international legal instruments such as the
UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.

History of Tajik Peer-to-Peer Support Programs and Psychosocial
Support in Hospitals in Mine-affected Districts
2011. Six Tajik survivors attended the Afghanistan Landmine
Survivors Organization (ALSO) training on “Peer to Peer Support”
in Kabul, Afghanistan. Before starting the pilot project, peerto-peer support guidelines developed by ALSO were translated,
adapted, and published by TNMAC. Funded by the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP) and organized by TNMAC in
cooperation with the Tajikistan Campaign to Ban Landmines and
Cluster Munitions (TCBL&CM), the project was piloted during
the joint summer rehabilitation workshop for Tajik and Afghan
landmine survivors.
2012. With similarities between the Tajik and Afghan language and culture, in 2012, fifty landmine survivors from both
countries received psychological rehabilitation and sports lessons
for two weeks.
2013. The project was replicated and training occurred in
regional centers in Khorog, Khujand, Rasht, and Bokhtar. Sixtyone landmine survivors and persons with disabilities were trained
by Mr. Mahmadullo Davlatov, a professional psychologist who is a
person with a disability himself. During the training, each participant received mobile phones and training packages, which included
guidelines on peer-to-peer support, the referral system directory,
and the Law on Social Protection of Persons with Disabilities, etc.
2013–2014. Since 2012, the U.S. Department of State has supported the Tajikistan VA program to provide solutions and funding
for physical accessibility issues and to build capacity for doctors and
nurses in mine-affected areas, increasing psychological support to

landmine survivors and persons with disabilities. This culminated
with more than 200 doctors and nurses from trauma, surgery, and
anesthesiology departments participating in a four-day capacitybuilding training8 conducted by the Psychological Support Center,
which has experience in organizing psychosocial support activities
in emergency situations.
Medical personnel from mine-affected districts received training on providing PFA support to patients with traumatic amputation of limbs, including landmine survivors. Trainings focused
on providing psychological aid and psychosocial rehabilitation,
enabling participants to assess the psychological status of persons
with newly acquired disabilities. Additionally, trainings focused
on advocacy and how to change societal attitudes, raise awareness,
and create accessible spaces.
Within the first month of completion, 302 persons who underwent amputations, persons with disabilities, and patients who were
in need of psychological support underwent rehabilitation with the
techniques taught in the trainings.9
2018. A one-week certification training on psychosocial support in crisis situations was provided for local doctors from
mine-affected areas, conducted by an international consultant in
cooperation with the Ministry of Health and Social Protection of
Population (MHSPP). The training focused on integrating mental
health issues into primary healthcare in mine-affected districts to
improve the effectiveness of psychosocial care for patients, including mine survivors.10

“I consider ‘Peer-to-peer’ support as a … successful project because even survivors living in the remote rural areas
can be heard and get assistance. Peer Helpers Network has been established after training and served as a ‘Hot line.’
The first few years after the training the participants liaised with the trainers for supervision, discuss[ing] difficult cases. [The] hot line allowed persons who need psychological support to contact peer helpers through mobile
phones. [One of the challenges is that] this initiative was not further supported and we were not able to conduct
refresh[er] training. However, even now, trained beneficiaries continue using mobile phones for provision of support. Especially during [the] pandemic period, I personally was in contact with … mine/ERW survivors and provided
psychological support based on the knowledge received during peer helpers training.”
Umarbek Pulodov, ERW survivor. TCBL and CM Executive Director, 2009–2014
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Professional certification training on psychosocial support in crisis situations, Dushanbe, 2018.
Image courtesy of Reykhan Muminova.

Mental Health and Psychosocial Support During
the COVID-19 Pandemic
In addition to affecting the financial situation of mine survivors
in Tajikistan, the pandemic also impacted their psychological wellbeing. Therefore, in March 2020, TNMAC developed a presentation devoted to the “Prevention of Infection and Psycho-social
aspects of [the] COVID-19 pandemic.”11 The main objective was
to address the predominant psychosocial consequences created
by the pandemic relevant to HMA personnel, with a special focus
on landmine survivors and persons with disabilities who may be
disproportionally affected by the pandemic. Participants received
general information on preventing infection as well as coping strategies and methods to improve their psycho-emotional well-being.
They also learned relaxation and stress relief techniques.
A TNMAC VA officer conducted the first presentation for
TNMAC’s partners: paramedics working for FSD, NPA, and the
MoD. During the pandemic, this topic was included in the VA
TWG meetings' program conducted in Dushanbe and regional centers from 2020 to 2021. The VA TWG participants were landmine

survivors, families of victims, representatives of the Tajikistan Red
Crescent Society, local authorities, departments of social protection and disabled peoples’ organizations, relevant ministries, and
the ICRC.
Throughout the pandemic, a TNMAC VA officer was in communication with landmine survivors to monitor their health and
vaccination status. Additionally, in 2021, a blended approach for
counseling sessions, which includes both digital and in-person sessions, was implemented.
TNMAC is planning to hold summer rehabilitation workshops
in summer 2022 and will organize a post-COVID psychosocial
assessment of survivors and families in Tajikistan. TNMAC is
open to sharing its experiences in providing mental health rehabilitation and psychosocial support with HMA colleagues from
other VA programs, and plans to continue these projects for many
years to come.
See endnotes page 74
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NATIONAL CAPACITY BUILDING

for Humanitarian Mine Action
Activities in Iraq
By Mark Wilkinson, PhD [ United Nations Mine Action Service, Iraq ]

I

IRAQ

Baghdad

AN
JORD

n the last two years, the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) Iraq has conducted detailed
research into its management and delivery of improvised explosive device (IED) clearance activities. Some of this research has already been published, providing a more detailed insight into how
operational efficiency and effectiveness can be developed from models and tools derived from on-theground evidence. Much of this research has been shown to have real-world application, and the purpose
of this research has actually been quite simple: show that when methodologically sound observation
and analysis are contextualized within an operational mine action environment, there can be clear and
demonstrable benefits in clearance output as well as value for money. For UNMAS Iraq, the results
of this work have manifested in more sophisticated understandings of the operational environment,
a logical basis for the structuring of clearance teams, and an evolution of procurement processes. In
addition, this research has also driven a more innovative and open-minded approach to the delivery
of clearance—see, for example, the recently published analysis of the use of mechanical equipment in
IED clearance from UNMAS Iraq.¹ However, this research not only has value in terms of innovation and
thought leadership, it also helps demonstrate a far more striking dynamic—that conceptual clarity can
also directly drive evolution in the delivery of humanitarian mine action (HMA) activities.

An initial analysis of the whole life (procurement to demobilization) phases of clearance
capacities
delivered by UNMAS Iraq
SAUDI
ARABIA
showed that appropriate, effective, and efficient clearance capacities appeared to depend upon the balance of three key tenets: an
understanding of the exact clearance requirement, development
of the correct clearance capability, and achievement of the lowest

fit-for-purpose cost. Considered together, particularly within the
context of the procurement of new clearance capacities, it was
clear that a more comprehensive approach—focusing on the actual
effects (for example organizational leadership and management
KUWAIT
development) that a capacity was required to deliver—could
offer
significant benefits.

Understanding the Clearance Requirement

Country border

Administrative
border
Understanding
the clearance environment is obviously fundaCapital
mental to the development of any mine action capacity. In Iraq, a

detailed analysis of multiple clearance locations worked on over
several years of intense activity led to the development of definitions for simple and complex environments.
For the definition of a simple environment, three variables
appear to exist: technical, threat, and concentration of contamination. With regards to technical complexity, evidence showed
that within simple environments, most IEDs were of a consistent and relatively simple design (for example, with single, highmetal-content pressure plates; single battery; single detonator;
short length of detonating cord; and single main charge). Threat
assessments conducted in simple environments routinely provided
relatively low-risk findings in terms of difficulties for clearance
teams (in locating devices) as well as for IED operators (in formulation and conduct of render safe procedures). Here, the clearance
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Understanding the
clearance requirements

Developing the
correct capability

Optimum
Efficiency

Achieving the
lowest
‘fit for purpose’
cost

Venn diagram depicting optimum efficiency
within humanitarian mine action.
All graphics courtesy of UNMAS/Iraq.

An NNGO team leader delivers a briefing at the start of a working day.
environment might be considered two dimensional with surface
and sub-surface planes. 2 Finally, in terms of the concentration
(or extent) of contamination, simple environments reflected high
numbers of normally identical IEDs, often in straight lines (or
belts). Considered together, these three variables were considered
to be representative of simple environments.3
Further operational research showed that complex environments were defined by six variables: (1) a diverse range of complex IEDs, (2) the quantity of IED threats, and other explosive
hazard (EH) threats present; (3) a three-dimensional environment (surface, sub-surface, and vertical planes); (4) challenges

in accessibility to clearance sites for threat assessment; (5) reliance on semi-remote means for neutralization; (6) and the often
extreme consequences of accidental initiation. These variables
describe an environment far more challenging for the delivery of
safe and effective IED search, location, and neutralization than for
clearance activities in simple environments. Regardless, the defining features of both complex and simple environments into which
clearance capacities will be committed are intimately linked to the
processes used to procure the correct clearance capacity, as well as
the cost of doing so.4

Developing the Correct Capability
From this new understanding of the defining characteristics of
the clearance environment, UNMAS went on to use an evidencebased approach to develop a composite measurement of both
environmental and technical factors that could be used to drive
the development of optimized clearance capacities. The resulting
lethality index provided a way to consider each variable that contributed to overall task lethality as becoming a tool used to determine time-on-task and overall efficiency. This gave the conceptual
basis for, as well as a signpost toward, initiatives to continue to
refine and develop meaningful and metric-based tools that might
optimize clearance teams for specific environments. The development of clearance projects with modular teams (as currently seen
in residential area clearance activities in Sinjar) represents one
example of the utility of this type of flexible approach.

The value of the lethality index lies in its ability to drive the
development of clearance team capacity in three key ways. First,
it establishes a clear process for identifying appropriately trained
and equipped teams for clearance tasks directly relevant to the
IED environment and its technical considerations. Second, it acts
as a tool to identify cost savings early in the procurement cycle
for clearance teams tailored for actual operational requirements.
Third, it supports the nationalization and development of local
clearance teams through its rationalization of the process of training design, training delivery, on-the-job training, and continuing
professional development.5
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Achieving the Lowest Fit-for-Purpose Cost
So, assuming a sound understanding of the IED clearance
requirements and the capability required to deliver that activity,
how can the lowest fit-for-purpose cost be ensured? To answer
this, UNMAS turned its attention to conducting an evidencebased analysis and measurement of cost and performance data
for each clearance contract delivered under its authority. Of vital
importance, this work also formed the basis of additional research
relating to the fundamental donor question, “How much should
clearance cost?” This work effectively showed how a detailed
understanding of the threat environment could drive the procurement of the most effective clearance capacity, which in turn results
in the overall reduction of cost.
As a result, UNMAS Iraq was able to design and introduce a
lower-cost, higher-return business model that offered a logical and
coherent approach to procurement and operational planning, cost
reduction, and performance gains, all aligned with and compliant
to International Mine Action Standards for Quality Management.

Known as the new model, the subsequent procurement of IED
clearance activities resulted in a reduction of the contracted cost
of like-for-like clearance contracts by a factor of five over a twoyear period.6 With a sound, evidence-based justification of the
requirement for specific clearance capacity directly linked to the
operating environment, the new model effectively challenged the
high costs and profit margins of commercial clearance contractors in Iraq, while also directly questioning pre-conceived norms
relating to the make-up of clearance teams. Specialist commercial
clearance companies who were unable to adapt their operating
models were quickly replaced by international non-governmental
organizations (INGOs) who were able to operate with much lower
overheads and overall project delivery costs. In simple terms, a
thorough understanding of the precise clearance requirement
(and environment), the clearance capability actually required, and
what the lowest fit-for-purpose cost could be, defined optimum
efficiency.

Towards Sustainable National Capacity
As new model contracts became operational in Iraq, their role in
initiating a more cost-effective approach to IED clearance became
clear—one that could not only further drive down costs per-unitof-clearance in order to match the quickly reducing funds available
from donors but also mark a significant milestone in the transition of clearance capacity from international to national actors.
Not only was this an exciting opportunity for UNMAS, it offered
the possibility of developing a model for IED clearance that could

address one of the key paradoxes of HMA: how to break the cycle
of the requirement for full- and long-term funding by the international community. The prize for this work could be significant—
not only proof of the effectiveness of the processes described so far
and the possibility of broader application across other humanitarian activities—but also the possibility of a clear end state for
donors. The lasting legacy could be a sustainable national clearance
capacity.

The Next Step in the Evolution: The Partnership Model
The development of the Partnership Model marked a watershed for UNMAS Iraq. Through a not-for-profit modality (using a
grant), a methodology was built on the success and opportunities
for further development from the new model. Central to the logic
of the partnership model was that it fostered the development of
long-term partnerships between experienced and credible INGOs
with national (Iraqi-registered) NGOs (NNGOs).
The logic here was simple: take an experienced HMA actor and
fund it for a two-year period to develop an inexperienced and perhaps unaccredited NNGO to the point that it can effectively and

independently engage in EH clearance activities in its own right as
an exclusively Iraqi actor. Implicit in this aim was that a national
EH clearance NGO is not, and most likely cannot, focus solely on
clearance activities from the outset. This model therefore recognized that the capacity to conduct physical EH clearance is inseparably linked to the capabilities required to generate, train, direct,
and manage that capacity. As a result, the model is built around
an explicit acknowledgement that capacity enhancement comes
before clearance activities.

What Does an Effective Mine Action Actor Look Like?
In order to successfully manage this project, care was taken to
ensure that the required development activities detailing what the
INGO would actually do for and with the NNGO was not defined
in absolute and specific terms. The logic of this was that, by definition, an INGO specializing in HMA had already proven its ability
to develop capacity in multiple countries and environments. The
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track record for delivery of multiple projects along with a solid
reputation meant that the partnership model effectively trusted the
INGO to do what it knew it could do, should do, and needed to do
in order to build and develop its NNGO partner. Regardless, some
clarity was still required with regards to what capacity development actually meant. As a result, a fundamental part of the work to

The Capacity Development Process: Defining Capacities and End States
Management

{

The NNGO shall be capable of conducting the planning, organization, direction, and control required in order
to harness its capacities to deliver its full range of capabilities effectively and efficiently, in accordance with
national and international mine action standards

Programmatic

{

The NNGO shall be capable of independently identifying, bidding for, and winning funding sources to sustain its
activities, with a positive media presence, into the future

Operational

{

The NNGO shall be capable of safely, effectively, and efficiently delivering EH clearance activities in urban
and rural environments (using non-explosive means) in accordance with national and international mine action
standards

Support

{

The NNGO shall be capable of providing those support functions required to enable and facilitate the effective
running of the NNGO

Quality
Management

{

The NNGO shall be capable of using a Quality Management System to ensure internal and external requirements are met and that continuous improvement takes place for both operational (i.e. clearance—in accordance
with national and international mine action standards) and organizational activities

Leadership

{

The NNGO shall have leaders that motivate individuals at all levels to successfully carry out their duties, and aim
to retain and promote them, regardless of sex, age, ethnicity, or religion

Risk
Management

{

The NNGO shall be capable of systematically identifying, evaluating, and prioritizing risks (related to both operational and organizational activities) and applying resources in a coordinated and economical manner to minimize, monitor, and control the probability or impact of negative events whilst maximising related opportunities

Resource
Mobilization

{

The NNGO shall be capable of securing its own resources in order to sustain and develop its ongoing activities

develop this model was both an analysis of, and provision of direction on, what an effective mine action actor could look like.
The concept of delivery of the partnership model therefore identifies specific capacities (i.e., the things to be produced) linked to
specific capabilities (i.e., the things the NNGO can then do as a
result) in order to achieve a desired effect (i.e., the overarching

objective of the project; an NNGO that can effectively and independently engage in EH clearance activities, in its own right, as
an exclusively Iraqi actor). The capabilities are effectively the individual strands of the single rope that represents the NNGO’s ability
to function independently and effectively.

The Development Process: Capacities, Capabilities, and Effects
The capacities, capabilities, and effects within the partnership
model specifically relate to eight functional areas that were identified following a detailed analysis of multiple mine action organizations and projects. While not exhaustive, they do represent the
key elements that might define a credible mine action organization.

At the same time, and relevant to consideration of project risk,
the embedding and presence of these capacities within the target
NNGO offer at least some confidence in the ability of that organization to function in its own right.

Methods for Monitoring and Evaluating Delivery
The concept of delivery for the partnership grant was set against
an indicative two-year timeline that reflected both the anticipated
funds available for the project as well as an estimation of the likely
time it would take to develop an NNGO capacity that could stand
alone with a reasonable chance of survival. A total of eight milestones were defined over the two-year duration of this project, falling at the 3, 6, 9, 12, 15, 18, 21, and 24 month points. These serve
as a mechanism to monitor progress as well as manage associated
risk within the project, allowing for timely intervention if needed.
While the timeline was indicative of expected progress, it was not
developed in a manner that was intended to constrain activities,

nor be naïve to the possibility of delay and slippage, for example
due to delays in obtaining accreditation from the national mine
action authority.
In addition to delivery against time, the partnership model also
utilizes a monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system that is based on
the work plans produced by each INGO, reviewed at specific phases
of the project. This allows the INGO to report monthly progress
against each capacity development activity, aligned with and
measured against each defined end state. While a large amount of
evidence is produced related to each development activity, this is currently seen as an appropriate way to monitor progress of the projects.
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The end point? A national UNMAS Ops/QA officer speaks with a national clearance team leader
and other staff during a clearance task.

The Partnership: 2 Plus 1
While the model utilizes a partnership between the INGO and
NNGO, it is also a partnership with UNMAS Iraq. Honest, open,
and frank discussion throughout the project is seen as critical to
ensuring its overall success, and this has required a fundamental
shift in the UNMAS understanding of quality assurance activities.

The transition from the perception of some implementing partners
of UNMAS as a policing organization to an equal partner will continue to require work, but early results are encouraging within the
context of the extremely strong and positive relationships that have
been developed so far.

The Future
What lies ahead? The partnership model has been developed not
only as a logical response to the changing landscape and dynamics
of clearance in Iraq, but also as an efficient way to exploit the byproduct of several years of expensive commercial contracts, which
has produced large numbers of trained and experienced national
staff. If successful by the end of the three partnership model grants
currently funded in Iraq up to October 2022, there will be three
Iraqi NNGOs trained, structured, and ready to continue clearance

activities under their own funding and in a transparent and well
managed manner. It is also likely that the cost to continue to
deliver clearance activities using these NNGOs will be significantly cheaper than it is currently. Not only does this offer better
value for donors, it also represents a clear pathway for UNMAS to
hand over and exit leaving a legacy of professional, high-quality,
effective, and efficient national mine action actors.
See endnotes page 74

Mark Wilkinson, PhD
Senior Operations Manager
United Nations Mine Action Service, Iraq
Mark Wilkinson, PhD, is the Senior Operations Manager for UNMAS in Iraq. He has twenty years of
professional experience in military and HMA. As a former British Army Ammunition Technical Officer,
he worked as a High Threat IEDD Operator in several operational environments before transitioning to
HMA. Wilkinson has an active research agenda focused around IED clearance in HMA environments.
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By Roly Evans [ Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining ] and Dan Perkins

I

n February 2022, the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) Review Board approved a fully
revised Test and Evaluation Protocol (T&EP) 09.30 explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) Competency
Standards. It also approved amendments to the accompanying IMAS 09.30 (subject to the
approval of the IMAS Steering Group and Inter Agency Coordination Group) and the T&EP 09.31 IEDD
Competency Standards. The approval marked the culmination of sustained work over four years since
2018 to update not only conventional EOD competencies but to add improvised explosive device disposal (IEDD) competencies suitable for mine action rather than traditional security tasks. The changes
made are significant for field operations in the sector.

The new competencies were developed by a small drafting team,
with oversight from an IMAS Review Board Technical Working
Group (TWG). As might be expected, the working group was a
forum for extensive and sometimes robust debate. The new EOD
competencies alone took a year of discussion within the TWG
before being presented to the IMAS Review Board. That is entirely
correct for such important documents with significant implications

for those delivering operations in the field. Much of the discussion
involved trying to balance the desire to be more comprehensive in
the EOD knowledge and skills specified with the need to conduct
EOD tasks in a practical way that does not overstretch operational
budgets or overburden training programs. What has resulted is a
compromise that is inevitably imperfect but is a set of competencies
the drafting team hope represents an improvement for the sector.

Changes to EOD Competencies
The IMAS 09.30 on EOD was first developed in October 2001.
The EOD competencies were first developed as a CEN Working
Agreement (15464:2005 - Humanitarian Mine Action - EOD
Competency Standards) in 2005. In October 2014 these were
changed to become IMAS competency standards, contained in a
new T&EP (T&EP 09.30/01/2014). One significant change at this
point was the removal of the old EOD Level 4 and the change to
EOD Level 3+ competencies to reflect a range of specialist skills.
This new revised T&EP 09.30 represents a complete redraft.
From the previous 578 competencies, the T&EP has been revised

to a main body of 338 competencies divided into EOD Levels 1, 2,
and 3. In addition to these, there are now six clear EOD 3+ modules
that incorporate 380 EOD 3+ competencies in total. The increased
number of competencies is intended to better detail the range of
skills required from conventional EOD operators in mine action.
While it is a challenge to cover absolutely everything, the drafting
team’s intent was to include significantly more relevant detail in
this edition. The new set of competencies is sometimes referred to
as the 2022 T&EP as opposed to the 2014 T&EP.

What is a Competency?
IMAS defines the term competency standards as referring “to
units of competence required to undertake a given task effectively
and safely.” The term competence refers to the “specification of
knowledge and skill and the application of that knowledge and

skill to the standard of performance required in the workplace.”1
The key words here are “application of knowledge and skill.” For
the drafting team, the working shorthand for this were two simple
questions: “Do you know it? Can you do it?”

(Above) A logistic demolition of over 20 tonnes. Logistic demolitions with items from store, or bulk demolitions that include items of
AXO that are safe to move, are now covered in a standalone EOD Level 3+ module that focuses on demolitions range management.
Image courtesy of Roly Evans.
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Filling Gaps
A key task was to fill some significant gaps in the old competency list. The drafting team started with a list of subject areas that
needed to be included. For example, in the 2014 T&EP there was
no requirement for an IMAS EOD operator to understand hazard
classification codes in order to transport and store explosives as
safely as possible. That has now been rectified. There is now more
content on aspects such as commercial explosives. Operators in the
field often have to use what is available, and sometimes this means
using various forms of commercial explosive that can have different characteristics than the military high explosive on which they
might have been trained.
Another area where content was required was semi-remote
means, specifically the use of hook and line equipment for pulling.
The 2014 T&EP had nothing on pulling. This is a widely used technique, especially during immediate post-conflict field operations,
where explosive means are often unavailable. Now these skills are
required in order to gain an IMAS EOD qualification.
A key area of improvement was the subject of fuzes. In the previous set of competencies, fuzes were mentioned briefly twice.
In this set, within just the IMAS EOD Level 1–3 list, fuzes are
covered in forty-six competencies. The intent is that EOD operators should be trained to know what fuzing they will encounter in
the field and very importantly assess the condition of that fuzing.
The course of action adopted during an EOD task does not solely
depend on the type and state of a given fuzing system, but the fuze
will typically be a key determinant of how the task is conducted
as safely as practicable. As with many mine action field activities,
risk management is fundamental in EOD. The only way risk can
be managed effectively on most EOD tasks is an understanding
of how a device may function, and that means understanding the
fuzing system(s) involved.
The competencies also try to take a renewed reference to the
relevant protocols of the Convention on Certain Conventional
Weapons (CCW). For example, the terms Explosive Remnants
of War (ERW), Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) and Abandoned
Ordnance (AXO), defined in Protocol V of the CCW, are not found
in any of the previous competencies. These are useful terms, not
least since they differentiate the likely risk of a given explosive hazard that “has been primed, fused, armed, or otherwise prepared
for use and used in an armed conflict.”2 Other general terms that
have been (re)introduced and detailed include Explosive Ordnance
Reconnaissance (EOR).
One new area for both training establishments and operators to
consider is the pollution risk from explosive ordnance (EO). For
the first time, IMAS EOD training includes content on toxic hazards of lead and heavy metal tungsten alloys (HMTA) and residue
loading risks from both traditional and more modern insensitive
energetics. There is also some content on basic mitigation methods
to at least try to minimize the pollution risk inherent in clearing
EO in the field. Another area that is covered for the first time is the
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An AA-8 Aphid/R-60
air-to-air missile, still in
some of its packaging,
after an explosion at
an ammunition depot.
Guided weapons
competencies have now
been rationalized into a
single EOD 3+ module.
Image courtesy of Roly Evans.

handling of human remains. Unfortunately, it is a reality that EOD
operators may encounter human remains in the course of their
duties, not only during standard clearance tasks but also during
other scenarios such as accident investigation.
Arguably the most important gap that was filled was a revised
emphasis on reporting and data. The 2014 T&EP 09.30 does not
contain the word data. The new version and the T&EP 09.31 both
have a specific competence category title “Reporting and Data.”
The emphasis is on operations staff collecting data to enable better
risk management for their own operations. It is in their interests to
collect the data they will use, for example, whether it is for threat

A mechanical break up of a MK-83 bomb. Aerial bombs are now a distinct 3+ module, although
low order techniques are included throughout EOD Levels 1–3.
Image courtesy of Roly Evans.

assessment of anti-lift devices under anti-vehicle mines or threat
assessment of the locations of IEDs implanted along a given route.
If anything, the drafting team would wish to add much more in

this respect, such is the importance of operational data, gathered
by EOD operators for EOD operators, to the effective delivery of
mine action operations.

EOD 3+ Modules
The nature of EOD 3+ has been significantly revised. From an
old set of 100 competencies covering eight “specialist” skill sets,
including IEDD, a new set of six EOD 3+ modules containing 380
competencies has been developed. The new modules are Advanced
Explosive Theory, Aerial Bombs EOD, Armored Fighting Vehicle
(AFV) Clearance, Basic Chemical EOD, Bulk Demolitions, and
Guided Weapons.
Advanced Explosive Theory is entirely new. It incorporates not
only traditional explosive theory in much more detail than before,
but also for the first time covers the important subject of confirming devices made free from explosive (FFE) or INERT. This is very
clearly not making items FFE, which is a highly demanding skill
set, but it is assessing items to confirm the absence of explosive.
This in itself is demanding since it requires an intimate knowledge
and understanding of EO, with the ability to actively confirm the

absence of explosive. There are many items claimed as FFE across
mine action programs but at present nothing to qualify those who
have made or confirmed them FFE. Now, at least for the latter, there
are relevant competencies.
Another of the new 3+ modules of particular note is Bulk
Demolitions, sometimes also referred to as logistic demolitions.
The title “Bulk Demolitions” was chosen in order to better reflect
the destruction of AXO found in the field rather than just items
from stockpiles. The drafting team believes the sector is potentially
carrying quite a bit of risk at present in regard to bulk demolitions
and that more routine risk management is required. Previously
bulk demolitions could be conducted without an ability to develop
what should be standard documents such as range standing orders.
It is hoped the new requirements will encourage improvement.

Areas Not Covered
The drafting team proposed EOD 3+ modules on Detection,
Accident Investigation, and EOD Instruction and Accreditation.
The level of detection skills in the sector was identified by the drafting team as an area for improvement. A lively debate was conducted

on whether EOD incorporated detection of EO as per the respective definitions. While it was reconfirmed that detection and
indeed clearance drills in general were very much a part of EOD,
the case for a specific detection 3+ module was not successful.
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Old 0930

New 0930

MANAGEMENT
229
POST TASK
ACTIVITIES
26

EQUIPMENT
46

REMEDIATION
27

TRANSPORTATION
OF EXPLOSIVE
ORDNANCE
45

Storage & Transport
29

Theory & Knowledge
112

Reporting
& Data
Deployment
& Post Task

FINAL DISPOSAL
78

Equipment
Skills
18

Practical EOD Skills
86
LOCATING AND SAFE ACCESS
111

Management & Leadership
62
KNOWLEDGE BASE
98

Figure 1. Comparison of competency distribution between the 2014 and 2022 versions. Note
the appearance of Reporting and Data in the revised version, an essential requirement to
conduct threat or risk assessments.
Figure courtesy of Remoedy Plan Spatial Ltd.

Also unsuccessful was the case for Accident Investigation competencies, specifically those inherent in a site investigation. For
many it was recognized that accident investigation very much is
an EOD task suitable for those with the advanced skills, knowledge, and extensive experience. It is possible these might be revisited at some point in conjunction with IMAS 10.60 – Investigation
and Reporting of Accidents. A 3+ module on EOD Instruction
was designed to provide some means of training experienced

operators to be instructors. At present there is no means to qualify
EOD instruction in mine action, with organizations relying on
generic EOD qualifications, and ideally experience. Teaching is
a specific skill set, and it is hoped consideration will be given to
developing more on EOD instruction in the future. Any future
set of competencies would also benefit from an agreed classification of conventional ordnance that takes account of the respective
disarmament treaties.

Amendments to IMAS 09.30
The drafting team were relatively constricted in how much they
could change the second edition of IMAS 09.30; however, amendments were permitted so that the IMAS was consistent with a
revised T&EP. Most important of these amendments were slight
changes allowed by the TWG to the IMAS level definitions. Some
members of the TWG were adamant that EOD Level 1s and 2s
should continue to be able to conduct the demolitions they are
already performing in the field. As a compromise this was conceded albeit with the new proviso that single item demolitions for
Level 1 should be conducted in a controlled environment such as
a minefield clearance site or demolitions range. Level 2s can effectively continue to conduct roving tasks and make decisions on
whether items are safe to move, despite the reservations of some
TWG members. However, Level 2s must be specifically authorized
in writing by a higher EOD Level in the demining organization
to do so. The written authorization can last as long as specified
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by that organization. In this way, a compromise tried to combine
continued flexibility for organizations alongside an ownership of
risk principle.
This ownership of risk principle was also used for the Net
Explosive Quantity (NEQ) limits EOD Level 3s can destroy during
tasks. The old 50 kg limit was retained for all items of EO. However,
organizations that feel their EOD Level 3s have the knowledge and
skills to do higher limits can authorize them in writing to do so.
The 50 kg limit also has a value for training organizations who
might struggle to obtain expensive explosive targets. (If a donor
charge is not included, 50 kg NEQ can mean approximately 119 x
82 mm HE mortar rounds, still a noteworthy demolition that could
represent a significant training cost.)
The issue of EOD task logs for individual operators was one of
the debates within the TWG. However, the IMAS Review Board
decided to update the IMAS 09.30 so that EOD logs would be a

UN IEDD

NEW 0931

IEDD
MANAGEMENT
AND TRAINING

Theory & Knowledge
117

KNOWLEDGE BASE
176

EQUIPMENT SKILLS AND
DRILLS PRACTICAL
52
Reporting & Data
33
POST TASK
ACTIVITIES

Deployment & Post
Task
25

Equipment Skills
61

IEDD ACTIVITIES PRACTICAL
139
Practical IEDD Skills
50
Managment & Leadership
36

Figure 2. Comparison of competency distribution between the UN IEDD Standards and T&EP
09.31 IEDD standards. Both sets of standards have an important role to play. T&EP 09.31 is
focused more on the mine action context rather than any form of C-IED.
Figure courtesy of Remoedy Plan Spatial Ltd.

“shall” requirement, not only for demining organizations but also
for individual operators. The IMAS secretariat along with the drafting team will follow up with guidance about how such logs might
be “grandfathered” into the sector. The likelihood is that those who
wish to comply with IMAS will need to start keeping logs for future
EOD tasks, not past ones.
Another small, albeit key change was concerning the “shall”
requirement for demining organizations to “ensure that the EOD
operators are competent and suitably trained and qualified.” This

T&EP 09.31
T&EP 09.31 was developed to identify specific IED standards
for mine action. That meant competencies that reflected more of
the humanitarian context mine action tends to operate in rather
than a security context associated with peace support operations
or military Counter-IED operations. Previously IEDD in mine
action had been “covered” by eleven competencies only in the old
T&EP 09.30. Now IEDD is covered by the 322 competencies of

was a long-standing requirement under the old IMAS. The change
in the new IMAS is that this must now be confirmed in writing.
In short, organizations can no longer take an EOD qualification
certificate on trust, they must essentially validate that certificate
themselves. Many would say this has always been the case, and it is
certainly true that many responsible organizations have been conscientious in ensuring their staff are the EOD standard they say
they are. However, requiring this to now be formally done in writing will add that extra level of confidence that EOD skills claimed
are reconfirmed.

T&EP 09.31, also very slightly amended in 2022 having built on the
experience of recent years. The competencies reflect both the classic single IED task and deliberate clearance of areas contaminated
by IEDs. Elements of IEDs that are associated with an active threat,
such as electronic counter measures (ECMs), or elements that are
associated with significant cost, such as remotely operated vehicles
(ROVs), were listed as IEDD 3+ competencies.

Revised Structure
In both T&EP 09.30 and 09.31, a new structure has been adopted
that is intended not only to make each competency clearer but also
position each competency within a more detailed taxonomy. This
groups relevant competencies together in a more comprehensive
way than before. A description for each competency is intended

to give enhanced detail about what exactly is meant. This is supplemented by suggested training times and suggested test types.
Before there was no requirement to assess the application of EOD
skills and knowledge with practical tests in order to gain a qualification, although many conscientious training providers did this
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A damaged T-72 main battle tank. Although
not heavily damaged, the clearance of the
vehicle of AXO and Explosive Reactive
Armour (ERA) is still a lengthy EOD task.
AFV Clearance competencies are now
rationalized into an EOD 3+ Module.
Clearance of AFV is likely to be a significant
part of future clearance efforts in Ukraine.
Image courtesy of Roly Evans.

anyway. Now, while still only suggested, there is clear guidance as
to how a given competency can be appropriately tested, whether it
is a timed written exam, a focused skill test, or an assessed live task.
Assessed live tasks, normally under time pressure, are the acid test

of any EOD knowledge and skills and should be a norm for EOD
training in mine action. Suggested training times are indicative,
and some competencies might be merged into the same period of
instruction.

Links Between Each T&EP
It is intended that the T&EPs work where necessary as a combined package. Practically, this means that for a given IEDD
level, the operator is expected to have the equivalent EOD Level
as a prerequisite up to Level 3. For an operator to qualify as an

IEDD Level 3, they should have also qualified as an EOD-3 and
ideally have had plenty of experience in that role prior to going
onto IEDD training.

Possible Future Improvements
While the new T&EP is only months old, the drafting team have
already identified areas for improvement, including ways to rationalize some of the competencies for Levels 1–3, along with adding content in areas that did not survive the various edits of the TWG. The
drafting team is aware of areas where greater consistency is possible.
These T&EPs will of course age as the EOD practice develops
over time. However even now it is possible to identify areas where
more content will be required at some point. Consideration of the
environment is a growing requirement for what is termed “UXO
clearance” operations in the United States. How operators can
dispose of EO is becoming increasingly restricted, with the use of
open burning open detonation (OBOD) slowly decreasing. Mine
action will follow to some extent, and EOD competencies should
reflect that.
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It is also possible that more EOD 3+ modules will be added in
time. The possibility of EOD Instructor and Accident Investigation
and Detection modules have already been mentioned. Other
options include EOD Quality Management above that already
required in the EOD 1–3 competencies, the development of an
Underwater EOD 3+ module, a module specifically dedicated to
booby traps, a module on exploitation of conventional ordnance,
and a module on the design and conduct of EOD equipment trials.
It is important to stress that these new competencies represent
a minimum of what operators should master if they wish to claim
an international mine action EOD qualification, not a maximum.
Many responsible training organizations will wish to add extra in
areas, and cover subject matter not included here. For example,
there is insufficient material on munition marking and color codes

in Levels 1–3. Other examples include competencies
that were not included due to availability of equipment.
For example, some will train use of X-Ray at EOD-3
in order to facilitate threat assessment and render safe
procedure (RSP) design, but for many organizations
that equipment is not available and should not be a
show stopper to gaining an IMAS EOD Level 1–3 qualification. Many training opportunities and individual
instructors will understandably and rightly wish to go
beyond the minimum.

Conclusion
This article gives a very brief survey of some of the
key changes made to these important documents.
T&EP 09.31 has been in use for nearly four years, and it
is hoped a similar structure will work well for the conventional EOD competencies detailed in the revised
T&EP 09.30. The aim is to improve the quality of
EOD training, and thus EOD operations. These documents are far from the final word on that ongoing task.
However, they do represent significant change for the
sector. That change has been subject to prolonged scrutiny and represents a compromise between a range of
interests. It should be stated clearly there are now more
requirements on training organizations and operators. However, those requirements are justified. Some
operators have made the point that these competencies
in many ways reflect what they were doing anyway,
and now that they are codified IMAS requirements,
the playing field will be a little more level. While these
competencies will never cover everything to everyone’s satisfaction, they should represent a real practical
improvement that assists the mine action sector to do
a better job for those at risk from explosive hazards in
the field.
See endnotes page 74

A typical Victim Operated IED in its constituent parts.
The variety in potential layout of the components
presents the operator with challenges that demand a
different set of competencies to that of conventional
EOD. Since 2018, T&EP 09.31 had detailed IEDD competency standards for mine action
Image courtesy of Daniel Perkins.

Roly Evans
Advisor
Geneva International Centre for
Humanitarian Demining
Roly Evans is an Advisor at the Geneva
International Centre for Humanitarian
Demining (GICHD) where he runs the
Explosive Ordnance project. He also develops IMAS, T&EPs, and TNMAs for the mine action sector. He
has worked in the fields of survey, clearance, EOD, and physical security and stockpile management in Africa, Europe, the
Middle East, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. He holds an MSc
in Explosive Ordnance Engineering.

Dan Perkins
Consultant
Dan Perkins consults on EOD and ammunition technical matters within mine action,
as well as working as a data and decision support analyst across construction,
health, and logistics. A former IED disposal
operator and ammunition technical officer, he
is passionate about mine action standards, multi-disciplinary
working, and enabling capability development.

ISSUE 25.3 @ SPRING 2022

51

ENVIRONMENTAL SOIL SAMPLING
AND ANALYSIS:
Application in Supporting Sustainable
Land Use Practices in Areas Impacted
by Explosive Ordnance
By Bui Doan Bach, Kimberley McCosker [ Norwegian People’s Aid ], and Linsey Cottrell [ Conflict and
Environment Observatory ]

A

ssessing the humanitarian impact of explosive ordnance (EO) has been an integral part of the
land release process for decades. However, rarely have environmental aspects been included,
despite the fact that EO can impact the environment in several ways, adding to the overall
humanitarian impact of the use of explosives.
EO can damage vegetation and
cause soil degradation and compaction when it explodes, consequently
destroying the soil structure, reducing soil stability, and reducing soil
fertility.1 While there are many
human activities that degrade soil,
such as intense agriculture, deforestation, overgrazing, and loss of
cover vegetation, conflict-affected
areas are typically highly vulnerable due to several factors. Soil is a
precious resource, and soil health
is essential to food security, sustainable livelihoods, and wellFigure 1. SDG15 sets out to
functioning ecosystems. Degraded
protect and restore life on land.
soils lose their capacity to store
Figures courtesy of UN Sustainable
water, nutrients, and carbon, and Development Goals.
to support important soil microbes.
In Syria, vegetation change and soil erosion are among the activities durmost serious environmental issues associated with the conflict.2 ing heavy rainThe UN Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 15 Life on Land fall or strong
includes the aim to halt and reverse land degradation and is a key winds, and reducing the number and size of areas exposed at any
one time.5
enabler for many other SDGs.
EO itself is also a potential source of chemical contamination.
The u se of mechanical e quipment such a s fl ails, ti llers, or rollers to clear land of explosive remnants can also adversely impact This includes the energetic material as well as other munition comsoils due to the loss of soil structure, erosion, and compaction.3 ponents such as metals (e.g., antimony, chromium, lead, mercury,
Mechanical clearance has the potential to cause significant e nvi- and zinc). Although the environmental impact of a single denotaronmental impacts; IMAS 07.13 encourages minimizing the area tion of an individual munition item is likely to be minor, multiple
subject to the use of mechanical techniques through well-targeted denotations or munition disposal activities could lead to elevated
survey and clearance operations.4 Measures to minimize the adverse levels of contaminants in the environment.6 Degrading over time,
effects f rom m echanical c learance i nclude a voiding c learance EO causes hazardous chemicals to leach into the ground or water
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as casings corrode. Pollution caused by EO can persist and present
long-term risks to people and the environment for many years after
the conflict has ended. The level of risk will depend on the nature
and extent of the pollution (or contaminants) present, the local
environment, the sensitivity of the environs, and how the impacted
area is accessed and used.
In some conflict settings, the sources of chemical contamination
may be a result of direct damage of infrastructure, or from the use
of particular weapons.7 The tons of debris that can be generated by
conflict in urban areas present many risks and challenges, including the potential exposure to harmful chemicals and hazardous
materials, such as asbestos. The widespread use of defoliants by

the United States during the Vietnam War such as Agent Orange,
which contained the highly toxic dioxin 2,3,7,8 TCDD, has also left
a legacy of exposure risk, including polluted soil and water, leading
to some contaminated food chains8 more than forty years after the
end of the conflict.
The nature and significance of the environmental impacts from
the use of EO will vary considerably between settings. When quantifying the potential risk to either the environment, people who
access the area, or how ground conditions may influence future use
of the area, it is important that mine action actors understand the
baseline state of the existing environment.

A source-pathway-receptor (SPR) model can be used to assess the potential for unacceptable risk.
Without a SPR linkage, there is not a risk.

SOURCE

PATHWAY

RECEPTOR

E.g.

E.g.

E.g.

» Metals and explosives
from aged and corroded
munitions on land

» Leaching into soils and
underlying groundwater

» People

» Run-off to surface water
» Dermal contact, ingestion
or inhalation of
contaminated soils
» Ingestion of contaminated water
» Consumption of crops

•
•
•
•

Agricultural and site workers
People with direct access to
contaminated areas
People living in proximity to
contaminated areas
Consumers of local produce
and water

» Water resources
» Flora and fauna

Figure 2. SPR Model.

Quantifying Potential Environmental Impacts and Risks
Few studies have been carried out within conflict-affected settings to assess the impact of EO on land quality and the impact
on soil productivity. A pilot study in Vietnam, funded by the
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (see pilot study), has been
undertaken to develop tools and procedures to assess such impacts,
and to help inform decisions on the suitability for future land use
and agriculture. Soil degradation is an escalating environmental
risk9 and a critical consideration during the land release process as
land use pressures increase.
Soil degradation involves a number of processes including erosion by wind and water, salinization, and pollution. Soil organic
content can be a useful indicator of soil health and was used as an
indicator in the pilot study. This is because of its association with

nutrient cycling as well as water infiltration, soil biodiversity, vulnerability to erosion, and crop yields or productivity.
Contaminants—which may accumulate and persist in the
ground due to the presence, use, or disposal of EO—have the
potential to affect human health and may migrate to underlying groundwater or nearby surface water. The source-pathwayreceptor (SPR) model (see Figure 2) can be used to understand and
assess the environmental risks from suspected or confirmed contamination. For a source (or contaminant) to present a risk to a
receptor, they must be linked by an exposure pathway. Receptors
could be people, crops, grazing livestock, surface water, groundwater, flora and fauna, or buildings and buried infrastructure.
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Where there is a viable pollutant linkage, appropriate sampling
and analysis of soil and water will provide a better understanding,
help quantify the risks, and decide whether risks are unacceptable.
If the risk is unacceptable or uncertain, remediation or corrective
action may be needed to manage or reduce the risk. Investigations
and the collection of samples are typically phased, with the information from the initial or preliminary sampling and analysis used
to inform the design of further investigations, if deemed necessary.

When developing a soil sampling and analysis strategy, it is
important to understand the history of the area under investigation to ensure that sources of potential contamination are not overlooked. In some cases, this may include sources of contamination
not directly linked to the conflict itself. This should form part of
the non-technical survey (NTS) and be used to establish the nature
and possible areas of contamination, and support development of a
SPR model for the site.

Pilot Study: Vietnam
Study Area and Methodology
Study Area
The pilot study was carried out by Norwegian People’s
Aid (NPA) in Vietnam, in collaboration with the
Thua Thien Hue, Vietnam
Institute of Resources and Environment (IREN) at Hue
University and the Union of Friendship Organization
in Thua Thien Hue Province (see Figure 3). The study
site is located in Luong Mai Village in the coastal sandy
area of Phong Dien District, Thua Thien Hue Province
in Central Vietnam.
Historically, Luong Mai Village was a United States’
defensive location, and multiple bunkers can still be
found in the village. NPA’s cluster munition remnants
survey identified one confirmed hazardous area in
Luong Mai Village, covering 259,770 m2. Clearance of
the study site started in January 2018. In 12 months, 271
EO items were found, including 210 cluster munition
remnants, 29 grenades, 26 mortars, 3 projectiles, 2 TNT
rounds, and 1 rocket.
Image date 1st March 2021,
To date, there has been limited research done in
Imagery from Google Earth,
200 m
Image (C) 2021 Maxar Technologies
Vietnam to specifically look at the potential impacts
of heavy metals from munitions impacting agricultural soils or the surrounding environment. Anecdotal Figure 3. Study Area, Thua Thien Hue, Vietnam.
reports from local farmers had suggested lower crop Image courtesy of NPA/CEOBS, with imagery from Google Earth and Maxar
Technologies.
yields within areas impacted by EO, with a concern
that soil quality was affected. Lower crop yields
may be due to a combination of factors including soil structure, soil nutrient and organic content, moisture content, and salinity as well as the
potential presence of elevated concentrations of
contaminants.
The project aimed to assess the soil conditions
within the study area, determine the presence and
potential environmental impact of heavy metals,
consider farming options, and develop recommendations to improve land use practices. The final
results of the pilot study will also be shared with
the community to communicate potential risks,
explain how any unacceptable risks could be managed, and provide recommendations on how the
land may be cultivated or used.
NPA’s Vo Duc Ngoc conducts a household-level survey
Members of the NPA NTS team were trained
with Mrs. Nguyen Thi Ty of Luong Mai Village.
to collect soil samples from areas with known
Image courtesy of NPA Vietnam.
contamination from EO. IREN carried out the
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Soil test category

Parameter

General

pH, dried soil mass, particle size,
salinity, cation exchange capacity,10
soil organic content

Nutrients

total nitrogen, total phosphorus,
potassium

Contaminants - metals

arsenic, cadmium, copper, lead, zinc

Table 1. Soil analytical suite for Thua Thien
Hue pilot study.
Table courtesy of NPA/CEOBS.

NPA’s Le Thai Anh and Le Trung Hieu complete
training on the collection of soil samples under
the guidance of IREN’s Ms. Tran Thi Tu.
Image courtesy of NPA Vietnam.

laboratory analysis of soil samples for metals and other soil
parameters (see Table 1).
The study area was divided into a 50-m-by-50-m grid, with a
total of 60 soil samples collected at varying depths from 20 grid
locations following a standardized sampling methodology. Sample
location data was recorded using GPS and NPA’s existing information management systems for NTS. The methodology was

considered by the NPA team to be straightforward and could be
replicated in other areas, where necessary.
The NPA NTS team also interviewed people from one hundred households in Luong Mai Village to understand their needs
and current practices, specifically relating to current use of land,
agricultural opportunities, and challenges. Economic pressures
mean that cultivation was already planned for the area from where
the samples were collected, in spite of the sandy conditions and
concern about the potential for soil contaminants to be present.
Cultivation plans primarily included growing peanuts, cassava,
and yams, plus low-value forestry such as acacia trees and some
livestock grazing and poultry. Knowledge of soil conditions and
adoption of practices to ensure safe, viable, and sustainable land
use is therefore important.

Study and Area-Wide Characteristics
Forest and vegetation cover across the country was heavily impacted by both the
French colonial war and conflicts during the 1960s and 1970s. Defoliant spraying
alone was estimated to have destroyed over two million hectares of Vietnam’s forests
by 1971.11 While there is no evidence that the pilot study area was subject to spraying
by defoliants, the area is located in Thua Thien Hue Province, which was also one of
twelve provinces most heavily sprayed with the defoliant Agent Orange during the war.12
In spite of forest recovery across some parts of Vietnam, open
source data on tree cover for the study area’s Phong Dien District
indicates an estimated 19.8 percent loss of tree cover
across the district from 2000 to 2020 (see Figure 4).
Interviews with the local community have highlighted their concerns about forest decline, which
had been previously relied upon for local livelihoods.
The pilot study area itself is part of a sandbar, which
stretches approximately 50 km, with sparse tree cover
and the area impacted by wind-driven erosion and sand
encroachment. Agriculture is already challenging due to
climatic, soil, and hydraulic conditions, with most farmers
relying on pesticide and herbicide use.

Figure 4. Tree cover loss across Phong Dien
district, with tree cover loss (red) and gain
(blue) from 2000 to 2020.

Figure courtesy of Source Earthmap/Hansen et al, Science 2013.
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Results
Unsurprisingly, the results of the soil sampling and
analysis carried out confirmed sandy and acidic soil
conditions. Acidic soil can increase the mobility and
bioavailability of certain metals, including copper and
zinc. The soil organic content (on average less than 1.3
percent) and nutrient levels were also low, indicating
that soil improvements would be needed to support
planting and agriculture in the area.
In this case, the results from the grid sampling and
soil analysis for metals did not indicate the widespread presence of elevated concentrations of arsenic,
copper, lead, or zinc. Arsenic and copper were not
recorded above laboratory detection limits, and the
recorded concentrations for lead and zinc generally
did not exceed the soil guideline value for agricultural
soils. An elevated zinc concentration was detected in
only one sample analyzed.13 The highest concentration for lead
was also recorded in this same sample, although the comparable soil guideline value was not exceeded. The average cation
exchange capacity (CEC) recorded in the soil samples analyzed
(8 meq/100 g) and low organic content indicates that soils within
the study area are more susceptible to leaching. This means the
potential loss of nutrients, as well as leaching of metal contaminants from soils. This pilot project was developed to trial the
sampling methodology and assessment protocol ahead of refinement and adoption on other sites, where EO has potentially
impacted land quality; however, the results from this pilot study
are site-specific and will not be indicative of soil conditions
or contamination across other EO impacted sites. The nature,
condition, and planned end-use of sites vary considerably. NPA

NPA’s Tran Hong Phuong and Nguyen Thanh
Tuan undertake soil sampling within the pilot
study area.
Image courtesy of NPA Vietnam.

aspires to critique and apply the methodology across more sites,
subject to funding and resources constraints.
Information from the NPA interviews with local farmers,
together with results from the soil sampling, helped IREN assess
future land use options and develop recommendations for optimizing sustainable land use practices. These include planting with
native species like melaleuca. Melaleuca is a perennial plant with
high tolerance to drought and waterlogging. It also produces an
essential oil, which has a commercial value.

Next Steps
The pilot project has been successful in developing survey and
sampling methodologies, as well as the IREN partnership. In this
case, the initial results of the pilot project do not indicate widespread elevated concentrations of metals present in soils.
Additional research is planned, including clarifying other
potential sources of chemical contamination through community
surveys and data collection. Combined with the soil laboratory
results, this will help inform a realistic recommendation for optimizing land use and promoting sustainable land management. The
results of the project will be shared with Luong Mai Village and
specifically the land owners, through a number of reports, digital
soil maps, and community training sessions. Further work with
IREN is planned and may include exploring the implementation of
nature-based solutions, such as selective planting to improve and
restore soil quality, and introducing soil stabilization techniques.
This will conclude the first phase of the project.
Further soil sampling and analysis is also planned to provide an
increased sampling density and target other potential sources of
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contamination—for example in proximity to certain recorded EO
finds. More specific methodologies will be discussed and tested by
NPA and IREN, including the collection of samples from directly
beneath larger EO prior to demolitions, and testing across different soils and terrains. The overall objective will be to better predict the level of risk to human health and the wider environment
from long-term EO contamination and potentially impacted soils
in central Vietnam. This may lead to the need to prioritize certain
clearance tasks and provide additional support to communities
before, during, and after clearance takes place. NPA and IREN
welcome further discussion with sector partners on the potential
direction that future phases of the project could take.
NPA is also developing a pilot standard operating procedure for
a “Total Mine Action Survey’ to further integrate environmental
protection with mine action activities. This methodology will combine NPA’s proven NTS approach with environmental survey and
response, as well as identification of victims of EO and their needs,
and provision of EO risk education, environmental awareness, and

climate risk education. There is potential to include soil sampling
into this new methodology, which will be piloted in late 2022. This
will include considering possible soil screening or rapid measurement techniques, since the cost of laboratory analysis is prohibitive

and falls outside the scope of traditional mine action grants. An
immediate goal is to seek alternative sources of funding for the
technical aspects of this project to enable a second phase of this
important work to continue.

Adopting Sampling Programs and Important Considerations
Information collected as part of community engagement and the
NTS is a key element of the baseline environmental data needed
to support environmental assessment strategies and sampling programs. The NPA/IREN study in Vietnam has been an important
exercise to pilot the methodology and develop assessment strategies. In adopting a similar sampling and assessment strategy, key
considerations include
1. Baseline knowledge of the soils present within the study area
and an understanding of how these fit with the wider landscape.
2. Identification of potential sources of chemical contamination, including explosive remnants of war but also other
sources from current or historic land use practices, waste
disposal, fires/burning practices, pollution from nearby
industrial sources, or from the deposition of airborne contaminants.
3. Understanding of the environmental setting of the study
area (e.g., groundwater regime, surface water features, local
flora and fauna) and current land use.
4. Development of a SPR model where there is potential for soil
contaminants to be present.
5. Design of a sampling and testing strategy that provides good
coverage of the study area and site, and adequately characterizes site conditions.
6. Knowledge of any planned land use and whether land will be
fit-for-purpose.
7. Use of appropriate assessment criteria to evaluate the soil
conditions and risks that meet the overall objectives of the
study assessment.
8. Development of appropriate sustainable soil management,
ecological restoration, conservation, and land-use practices
or control measures relevant to the site conditions and risks,
in consultation with the local community.
9. Communication of study findings to the local community
and other stakeholders, including the level of any risk and
how these will be managed.
The partnership between NPA and IREN, and support provided
by the Norwegian Government, has been invaluable in developing and implementing this pilot study. The ability to carry out
sampling and assessment programs by humanitarian mine action
organizations will rely in part on such specialist support and the
expertise of partners. The pilot study has been critical in developing the tools that can be adopted and applied across other sites and
support communities.
See endnotes page 74
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Image 1. HMA field personnel
set up a baseline TIR field
test site in the Iraqi desert to
learn about how the natural
environment and local weather
conditions affect sensing of
buried targets.

All graphics courtesy of the authors.

PROOF:

How TIR Imaging Can Locate Buried
Cluster Munitions in the Iraqi Desert
By John Fardoulis [ Mobility Robotics ], Xavier Depreytere [ Humanity & Inclusion ],
Jonathon Guthrie [ Norwegian People’s Aid ]

I

n this article, we follow on from our previous work published in The Journal of Conventional
Weapons Destruction that proved how buried thirty-year-old legacy anti-personnel and anti-tank
landmines could be located using thermal infrared (TIR) sensors in the Sahara Desert, northern
Chad.¹ This time, the emphasis is on proving how the location of buried submunitions from cluster
munition strikes in the desert of southern Iraq can be identified using TIR sensors.
Work took place as part of the Humanity & Inclusion (formerly Handicap International, HI) Odyssey
2025 Project, partnering with Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) and Mobility Robotics.

HMA Scope
Explosive hazards exist in large parts of southern Iraq from cluster munition strikes that took place during the Gulf War.2,3 Thirty
years later, areas are still littered with unexploded submunitions,
which cause casualties throughout the region, and it could take
decades to clear contamination using current practices. To address
this problem, we are evaluating the potential from new technology
and methods to accelerate the land release process, make operations safer, and save costs.
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, the baseline TIR field
study in October and November 2021 was the first to capture realworld data from a civilian TIR sensor in a legacy cluster strike location in the desert.
The scope of work was clear:
1. Could a TIR sensor capture thermal anomalies emitted
from buried submunitions found in the Iraqi desert? If not,

58

THE JOURNAL OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION

that would be a break point in terms of applied, real-world
research.
2. If 1. was possible, when do thermal anomalies from buried submunitions appear? The approach was empirical—observation
based, not theoretical.
The concept is to work on a progressive, evidence-based
model, achieving each milestone before moving to the next step.
Anomalies in this article represent surface temperature anomalies above buried targets as captured by a TIR camera. Noticing
any weather or other trends that affect when anomalies appear is
a bonus. Separating the degree of influence that each of the many
complex variables has on making thermal anomalies appear or
forecasting potential efficiency gains if such a sensor was deployed
in routine operations is beyond the scope of an initial baseline sensor field trial.
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Figure 1. The baseline TIR field test site was located adjacent to where cluster munition
clearance was concurrently underway, in a province with relatively widespread cluster
munition contamination.
For now, we are concentrating on when anomalies from buried
targets are visible to the TIR camera—parking most of the complex
science behind what makes the anomalies appear to the sensor for
later and adopting a black box philosophy regarding why such phenomena takes place.
An important reason to translate complex science into a simplified observation-based methodology is to encourage other
HMA actors to also capture baseline TIR sensor data regarding
each type of explosive hazards found in arid and perhaps semiarid locations where they work. The same methodology that we
have used for cluster munitions can also be used to determine if
sensors can capture TIR anomalies from buried landmines, buried improvised explosive devices, or buried explosive remnants of
war. This article endeavors to not only present findings but to also
share information about the process so that other HMA actors can
replicate such methodologies.

The reason for observing when TIR anomalies appear is for
insight regarding when such a sensor may be used operationally
in the future. A current way to remotely capture survey data in
suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) and confirmed hazardous areas
(CHAs) without people having to enter the hazard area is by flying cameras on unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)—also known as
small drones. Flying TIR sensors on UAVs to locate buried contamination would be the long-term goal, if they prove viable in the
real-world. Currently UAVs are mostly used in HMA to capture
daylight imagery, looking for direct evidence and/or ground-sign
indicators.4 Going beyond what is visible on the surface has led to
our field trials in post-conflict locations to capture real-world evidence as part of a process in determining how practical and effective TIR sensors can be in dealing with buried targets in the desert.

Hypothesis
Buried submunitions interfere with how thermal energy is
stored in and travels through the ground, creating hot or cold
patches on the surface above buried objects. The different surface
temperature above the buried target is an anomaly, an indicator

that contamination may exist beneath. The strength and timing of
when a hot or cold patch appears during the day or night depends
on many complex factors such as the target’s physical properties as
well as weather and environmental variables at the time.1,5–9
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Materials & Methods
We recorded high temporal and spatial resolution thermal
anomaly data from targets buried to known depths by a TIR camera mounted at a fixed height to assess sensor capabilities in identifying the presence of sub-surface submunitions. The automated

baseline TIR field test site continuously captured data at oneminute intervals over twenty-four-hour daily (diurnal) cycles during an autumn season.

Ground Composition
This article focuses on the performance of a TIR sensor in
capturing temperature anomalies from buried targets in sandy
ground. A second study also took place during the same field
mission with targets buried in hard, compacted ground found
at a second cluster munition clearance site approximately 10 km
away. While important to keep track of the soil type as a relevant

variable, many other complex variables are also at play, and it is too
early to make predictions based on one variable alone with results
from one location. However, soil samples were collected for future
analysis, as was the case during our baseline TIR field study in the
Sahara Desert, Chad.

Targets
Targets were thirty-year-old legacy,11 weathered, steel production submunitions recovered from the surrounding region. The
relatively thick, metal inner section of BLU-97 submunitions (not
the outer casing, spider, or parachute) were used for buried targets

M77

BLU-61

of that model because that is what was available, and it is the heavy
section that does not move in the desert. Targets were free from
explosives (FFE), which may exhibit a difference in TIR responses
to legacy, buried targets containing explosive fills.

BLU-97

BLU-63

Figure 2. Some of the weathered, legacy submunition targets buried in the baseline TIR
study. They are shown approximately to scale.
60

THE JOURNAL OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION

Baseline TIR Field Site
The baseline TIR field test site was established in the vicinity of
Al-Bussayah village, Muthanna, Iraq. The baseline site was set up
on land previously contaminated by cluster munitions but cleared,
approximately 300 m from an active cluster munition clearance site.
A grid of thirty-five 30 x 30 cm boxes was established at the baseline field test site, with the TIR camera covering that footprint from

Equipment and Software

a 4 m height. Targets were buried in the hard ground three weeks
prior to the study, giving them time to settle. Based on past experience with coarse sand in the Sahara Desert, Chad, we buried targets
one day prior in soft stand. A hole was dug and refilled in one cell as
a control for each ground type, and a large stone was placed on the
surface in a cell as a control during the hard ground study.

Weather station sensors

Commercially available equipment and sensors were utilized. Mounted on a 4.5 m high mast
(Figure 3), a FLIR Duo Pro R TIR camera with a
13 mm lens11 captured images every minute.
A consumer-grade weather station,12 with sensors mounted on the mast above the TIR camera,
recorded meteorological data. The power source
was a 200 Ah truck battery, which was swapped
out every five days. FLIR Tools13 and Microsoft
Excel14 were used for data presentation.

TIR camera
Video transmitter

Results

Weather station
data logger

Temperature anomalies emitted from submunitions captured by the TIR camera could identify
the position of buried targets in the Iraqi desert
not visible to the naked eye.

Characterizing TIR
Anomalies

Truck battery

Buried targets

Figure 3. The baseline TIR field test site set up, from which

This paper presents TIR anomalies from burresearchers logged thermal anomalies from buried targets
ied targets in two ways. First, we show copies of
in the Iraqi desert.
thermal images directly from the TIR camera’s
memory card for either the whole grid area, such as in Figure 6 and the y-axis in Figure 5. The shape of each line in the graphs also
Figure 7, or by cropping the data to focus on individual targets. The provides an idea about the rate of change in temperature, which
second way that anomalies are visualized is by showing a surface can affect how obvious an anomaly appears—i.e., the anomalies
temperature slice as a graph of the cross-sectional profile of tem- appear duller from deeper depths, as shown in Figure 4, where
perature change (driving force) caused by the TIR anomaly—e.g., cells (ii) and (iv) are duller than (i) and (iii), which corresponds with
in Figure 4 and explained in more detail in Figure 5. The position lines in Figure 5. Examples of thirteen different thermal anomaof where the temperature slice was taken is indicated by a blue line lies from buried targets captured by the TIR camera at night are
across the anomaly in the associated TIR image.
shown in Figure 6. Figure 7 shows thermal anomalies from the
The intensity of each anomaly is greater for shallower tar- same thirteen buried targets during the day, with Table 2 listing
gets, indicated by the strength of the driving force as shown on the depth of each target.

Day Versus Night
Temperature anomalies from buried metal submunitions used
in these trials appeared cooler than the surrounding surface during the day, and appeared hotter than the surrounding surface
during the night.
While visible for most of the night, anomalies from buried submunitions were evident during the day but only for a

limited number of hours. In some cases, the amount of anomaly thermal contrast was better at deeper depths during the day.
For example, the anomaly from the BLU-97 buried at 2.7 cm is
more evident during the day than the night (Figure 4 [iv] vs [ii] ,
and Figure 5 [iv] vs [ii] ).
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(i)

(ii)

(iii)

(iv)

Driving Force (Degrees Celsius)

Figure 4. Zooming in on examples of day and night anomalies from buried BLU-97 captured by the TIR camera from Figure 6 and
Figure 7. BLU-97 submunitions. Figure 4(i) and (ii) are from 0.7 cm and 2.7 cm depths at night; (iii) and (iv) are from 0.7 cm and 2.7
cm during the day. Weather information is available in Table 1.
2.5°

0.7 cm Night (i)

2.0°

2.7 cm Night (ii)

1.5°

0.7 cm Day (iii)
2.7 cm Day (iv)

1.0°
0.5°
0.0°
-0.5°
-1.0°
-1.5°
-2.0°
1

3

5

7

9

11

13

15

17

19

21

23

Pixel Number

Figure 5. Left is an example of a graph created by exporting
temperature values from each pixel in the TIR image to
Microsoft Excel to present a surface slice section from off
the side of the anomaly along a slice that goes through the
anomaly (e.g., blue lines in Figure 4), showing a cross section
of change in temperature emitted by the buried target. Each
graph shows the differences in temperature from across the
anomaly profile, subtracted from the surrounding bulk (plain)
surface temperature to calculate the driving force (anomaly
temperature minus bulk temperature) associated with each
anomaly. Thin lines from where values have been exported
are visible in each TIR image to show where the values for
each graph have been taken.
The graph above shows TIR anomalies from Figure 4 for
night and day anomalies from BLU-97 submunitions. Figure
5(i) and (ii) are from 0.7 cm and 2.7 cm depths at night; (iii) and
(iv) are from 0.7 cm and 2.7 cm during the day.

Day/Night Time

Air Temperature

Wind Gust (km/hr)

Solar Radiation (W/m2)

Humidity

Night 3: 19:30

27.9°C

5.8

0

20%

Day 2: 13:30

34.7°C

9.7

367

18%

Table 1. Night/Day Weather Conditions for data in Figure 6 and Figure 7.
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Figure 6. TIR anomalies from targets at a favourable time during the night. This TIR image was taken on Night 3 at 19:30. It
provides a good snapshot of thermal anomaly characterization for thirteen targets. Details regarding the burial depth of each
item is provided in Table 2. Dark is cool, light is warm.

Figure 7. TIR anomalies from targets at a favourable time during the day. This TIR image was taken on Day 1 at 13:30 for a good
comparison against the same thirteen targets and depths as in Figure 6 above. Dark is cool, light is warm.

Ref.

Target

Depth

(a)

PTAB-M

0.5 cm

(b)

M42

(c)

Ref.

Target

Depth

(f)

M77

1.0 cm

1.0 cm

(g)

BLU-61

M42

1.5 cm

(h)

(d)

BLU-63

1.0 cm

(e)

BLU-63

0.5 cm

Ref.

Target

Depth

(k)

BLU-97

0.7 cm

0.7 cm

(l)

BLU-97

2.7 cm

BLU-61

2.8 cm

(m)

PTAB-2.5KO

0.5 cm

(i)

BLU-97

2.0 cm

(j)

BLU-97

1.3 cm

Table 2. Target burial depths.
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Best Times to Operate
After selecting a large and small submunition as reference targets
to summarize when anomalies were visible, we reviewed 360 TIR
anomalies at thirty-minute intervals over four nights and three-anda-half days. A BLU-97 buried at a depth of 2.0 cm, which also acted
as a proxy for the two BLU-97 targets at shallower depths of 0.7 cm
and 1.3 cm was the large submunition reference target; a M77 buried
at 1.0 cm was the small submunition reference target. The visibility of
anomalies from reference targets in TIR images were ranked visually,
each assigned a category by a trained eye using a simple data review
method suited to a long-term goal of building capacity for future
studies to be led from in the field. The three categories are: visible
to the TIR camera (shown in Tables 3–6, 8, and 9 as green), weak
(orange), and not visible (red).
More advanced graphs showing anomaly surface temperature gradients are presented in this article as a training aid, but a long-term
goal is to democratize the use of baseline field test sites and not overwhelm HMA field personnel with burdens regarding data analysis.

The most important outcome is for trained personnel to note when
anomalies are clearly visible (the green category), which provides
insight into when to operate in the future. Tracking times when
anomalies are weak could be optional, leaving times when they are
not visible blank. This concept of simplified TIR anomaly interpretation was first prototyped with indigenous HMA field staff in Chad.
Table 3 shows that a TIR anomaly from the BLU-97 reference target
was consistently visible during the night, apart from being weak for a
few hours on the first and second nights, and towards the end of the
fourth night.
Table 4 shows that a TIR anomaly from the BLU-97 reference target
was visible for up to four hours during the day from late morning,
apart from the morning of the fourth day when it was windy.
Table 5 shows that a TIR anomaly from the M77 reference target
can be seen for most of the time during some nights, but visibility was
patchy on the first two nights and towards the end of the night during
the last two nights.
0630

0600

0530

0500

0430

0400

0330

0300

0230

0200

0130

0100

0030

0000

2330

2300

2230

2200

2130

2100

2030

2000

1930

1900

1830

1800

Night

(a)

1
2

(b)

3

(d)

→

4

(e)

→

(c)

Table 3. TIR Anomaly Visibility BLU-97 2.0 cm Depth, Night.
1730

1700

1630

0330

1600

1500

0300

1530

1430

1400

1330

1300

1230

1200

1130

1100

1030

1000

0930

0900

0830

0800

0730

0700

Day
1
2
3
4

Table 4. TIR Anomaly Visibility BLU-97 2.0 cm Depth, Day.
0630

0600

0530

0500

0430

0400

0230

0200

0130

0100

0030

0000

2330

2300

2230

2200

2130

2100

2030

2000

1930

1900

1830

1800

Night
1
2
3
4

Table 5. TIR Anomaly Visibility M77 1.0 cm Depth, Night.
1730

1700

1630

1600

1530

1500

1430

1400

1330

1300

1230

1200

1130

1100

1030

1000

0930

0900

0830

0800

0730

0700

Day
1
2
3
4

Table 6. TIR Anomaly Visibility M77 1.0 cm Depth, Day.
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Visible

Weak

Not Visible

Generally, anomaly visibility was most consistent at night. However,
other variables were at play that affected the anomaly strength other
than a twenty-four-hour diurnal cycle, weakening the apparent anomaly strength at times during some nights.
Better thermal contrast may be visible for some anomalies during
the day (e.g., BLU-97 targets in Figure 4 and Figure 7), but the operating window during the day is more limited, particularly for the M77.

Table 6 shows that a TIR anomaly from the M77 reference target
can be seen at around the middle of the day, but visibility can be
patchy. The amount of time that anomalies from the M77 reference
target were visible during the day was considerably less than for the
larger BLU-97 reference target for the same period.
Comparing thermal anomalies from the two different reference targets, M77 visibility was patchier than that for the BLU-97.

Wind Gusts

Wind Gust km/h

After identifying inconsistencies in
30
28
anomaly visibility during the same time
26
slots on different nights and days, we
24
(a)
22
checked wind speed data for those times.
20
(c)
Figure 8 shows wind gust data recorded
18
16
by the weather station for the length of the
14
(b)
study. Next to labels (a)–(c) in Table 3 are
12
(d)
(e)
10
times of weak anomaly visibility for the
8
BLU-97 reference targets during the night.
6
4
The same times as Table 3 (a)–(c) have been
2
marked on the wind gust chart (Figure 8),
0
with a trend seeming to be that the visibility of the BLU-97 anomalies deteriorate
Time
as nightly wind gusts increase. Similarly,
Figure 8. Wind gust data for the four nights and three-and-a-half days on site. Note that the
times when anomaly visibility was good weather station was not calibrated to scientific standards, and so measurements should be
have been labelled as (d) and (e) in Table 3, considered relative rather than absolute.
which corresponds with times of low wind
TIR anomalies from the BLU-97 reference target show similar
gusts, marked as (d) and (e) in Figure 8. The threshold between
weak and visible wind gusts in Figure 8 (b), 8 (d), and 8 (e) was trends during the day, with wind gusts dropping at around 11:00–
when wind gusts dropped below approximately 10 kph. Other fac- 12:00 on Day 1 to Day 3, corresponding with when green boxes
tors may have contributed to anomaly visibility, and weather sta- appear near the middle of the day in Table 4. The M77 reference
tion instruments were not calibrated to scientific standards, so care target seemed more sensitive, following similar trends, but was visible for less time.
must be taken if quoting absolute metrics.

12:00

9:00

6:00

3:00

0:00

21:00

18:00

15:00

12:00

9:00

6:00

3:00

0:00

21:00

18:00

15:00

12:00

9:00

6:00

3:00

00:00

21:00

18:00

15:00

12:00

9:00

6:00

3:00

0:00

21:00

18:00

TIR Anomaly Signatures by Submunition Type
The strength and size of anomalies varied by submunition type.
Spherical targets showed smaller anomaly sizes spatially, with the
shape of each anomaly roughly corresponding with a submunition’s top surface when covered by sand. The hypothesis was that
as the target was closer to the surface, its visibly would increase.
TIR anomalies were stronger for the larger BLU-61 than the BLU63 spherical submunitions. BLU-97 and PTAB submunition TIR
anomalies were long and rectangular in shape, as they are relatively
large cylindrical targets that were buried horizontally.

Figure 9 shows examples of typical TIR anomalies at night with
photos of each submunition below to compare with the physical
properties of targets. The amount of metal in each submunition
also varies, which could affect heat storage and thermal transfer
properties. Regarding the approximate amount of metal content
found in each submunition target, (small) M42s and M77s contain
130 g (medium) BLU-63s contain 300 g, and large BLU-61s and
BLU-97s contain 700 g.

Variability in Anomaly Strength and Trends by Depth
Table 3 to Table 6 provide insight regarding the variability of
anomaly strength for the large and small submunition reference
targets during different time slots.
The TIR anomaly strength can also vary at the same time on
different days or nights. For example, anomalies from four buried

BLU-97 targets were strong at 06:00 on Night 1 (left column, Figure
10 [a]–[d]) but noticeably weaker at 06:00 on Night 4 (right column, Figure 10 [e]–[h]). The difference in TIR anomaly strength
also affected the depth at which they were visible, i.e., BLU-97 TIR
anomalies can be seen up to a depth of 2.7 cm at 06:00 on Night 1
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(Figure 10 [d]) but are clearly visible only up to a depth of 1.3 cm at
06:00 on Night 4 (Figure 10 [f]).
Graph (i) compared to (ii) in Figure 10 shows the anomaly crosssectional temperature changes that substantiate such an interpretation, where a driving force greater than 0.5 degrees Celsius was
required for an anomaly to be visible in this example.
Weather data from 06:00 on those two nights (Table 7) shows
that the air temperature and humidity were similar but there was a
noticeable difference in wind gust speed. This matches the observations in Table 3 against wind gust data in Figure 8 for (orange)
weak anomaly strengths when wind gusts increased. Figure 4 also
shows that there can be variations in how deep TIR anomalies can
be seen at different times. A BLU-97 anomaly 2.7 cm deep was

M42

M77

BLU-63

visible at 13:30 on Day 1, compared to being barely visible at 19:30
on Night 3.
Target physical properties can also affect the depth at which
TIR anomalies are visible. A BLU-61 buried at 2.8 cm (Figure 6 [h],
Figure 7 [h]) appears barely visible, compared to the larger, visible
BLU-97 buried at 2.7 cm (Figure 6 [l], Figure 7 [l]).
Generally, during favorable conditions, the deeper targets produced anomalies that seemed more dull or hazy, in some cases
spanning a larger spatial area but at a lower intensity than that of
a shallower target of the same model. For example, Figure 4 (iv)
versus (iii) and Figure 10 ( d) versus (c) show how anomalies from a
BLU-97 at 2.7 cm are duller, with responses more dispersed off to
the sides than those from a BLU-97 buried at 0.7 cm.

BLU-61

BLU-97

Figure 9. Submunition targets and example night-time anomalies from Night 3 at 23:00. Anomalies and targets are presented approximately
to scale. Burial depths for TIR anomalies above are as follow: M42: 1.0 cm, M77: 1.0 cm, BLU-63: 1.0 cm, BLU-61: 0.7 cm, BLU-97: 1.3 cm.

Image 2: Left is an image from the daylight camera taken
on Day 1 at 13:30, at the same time as Figure 7, showing that
targets are not visible to the naked eye. Five surface targets
were also placed across the top row of the grid, with both
TIR and daylight imagery captured for these surface targets
every minute during the research period. This was to learn
about TIR responses on the surface, and perhaps potential
surface imagery techniques co-registering TIR and daylight
imagery, which can be discussed in a future article.

Different Ground Composition
As mentioned, a second baseline TIR study took place during the
same mission, in hard, compacted, crystalized ground (Image 3).
The second baseline study ran for seven twenty-four-hour periods.
Data presented thus far is from ground found at a cluster munition
clearance site approximately 10 km away from the hard ground
site, where targets were buried in soft, grainy sand (Image 4). Image
3 and Image 4 illustrate how both ground types looked different
under magnification.
Using a BLU-97 buried in hard ground at a depth of 2.2 cm as
a reference target (Figure 11), 336 anomalies were ranked at thirty
minute intervals into categories of visible (green), weak (orange),
and not visible (red), just as in Tables 3–6. Table 8 and Table 9
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display a visibility summary for the BLU-97 reference target in
hard ground found near Al-Bussayah.
TIR data showed that during the day, the sandy ground produced clearer TIR anomalies for the BLU-97 reference target
compared to the same reference target buried in hard, compacted
ground. Trends were similar between sandy and hard ground for
TIR anomalies at night, where anomalies were visible most of the
time, as can be seen in Table 8.
Reviewing weather data during times when anomalies were
either weak or not visible at night in hard ground showed the same
trend as in sandy ground—that an increase in wind gusts had a
detrimental effect on TIR anomaly visibility from buried targets.

0600 Night 1–Visible

0600 Night 4–Weak

(a)

(e)

(b)

(f)

(c)

(g)

(d)

(h)

(i)

(ii)

Figure 10. A side-by-side comparison of a column of anomalies from BLU-97 targets
buried at four different depths. The left above graph is from a favorable time (green
in Table 3) at 06:00 on Night 1, compared to the same targets at a weaker time, at
06:00 on Night 4 (orange in Table 3) in the above right graph.
Targets were buried at the following depths: Figure 10(a) and (e) 2.0 cm, (b) and (f)
1.3 cm, (c) and (g) 0.7 cm, (d) and (h) 2.7 cm. Graphs (i) and (ii) below present a cross
sectional perspective of the strength of each anomaly (driving force) in degrees
Celsius. The visibility threshold in this example seems to be a driving force greater
than 0.5 degrees Celsius.
Time:
06:00

Air
Temperature

Wind Gust
(km/h)

Solar Radiation
(W/m2)

Humidity

Night 1

19.1ºC

8.6

0

63%

Night 4

19.2ºC

18.7

0

62%

Table 7. Weather data at 06:00 Night 1 and Night 4.

Discussion
We proved that thermal anomalies emitted
from buried targets not visible to the naked eye or
regular daylight cameras can be captured by TIR
cameras to indicate the location of buried submunitions in the Iraqi desert.
In order to share anomaly characterization data,
we visualized forty-two different TIR anomalies
from weathered targets buried at our baseline field
test site. Additionally, we summarized findings to
suggest optimal operating times in the Iraqi desert by analyzing 696 TIR anomalies, presenting the
summary in Tables 3–6 and in Tables 8–9. These
summaries show that TIR anomaly visibility varies by time of day and submunition model, and
indicates that buried submunition targets could be
seen for most of the night, apart from when it was
windy. Performance-affecting factors such as wind
gusts can also affect the visibility of TIR anomalies
on a day-to-day basis.
An interesting new finding was that daytime
anomalies from buried submunition targets were
visible to the TIR camera in a sandy environment
for three to four hours each day during favorable
conditions. In some cases, there was better thermal contrast in sandy ground during the day than
at night. This is encouraging because of increased
risks as well as difficulties in gaining permission to
work at night.
Although too early to predict where else a TIR
sensor may or may not be viable based on results
from soil types found in the Muthanna Province
in Iraq, anomalies were visible in two substantially different soil types. Thus, our recommendation is to test on a case-by-case basis until
proof is collected from many other locations.
A time to conduct a dedicated soil comparison
study might be when samples are collected from
baseline trials in more than ten different countries or regions.
Addressing false alarm rates and blind tests were
not within the scope of an initial controlled sensor
baseline field study. Because we used thirty-yearold weathered production targets harvested from
contaminated sites in the region instead of surrogate or simulant targets, a target legitimacy study
was not required. Moreover, because work did not
take place in a research location outside of Iraq, an
environment and meteorological legitimacy study
was not required.
A logical question from HMA field personnel is
how deep such a potential tool might work. This
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Figure 11. (Left) A TIR anomaly from the BLU-97 reference target at a depth of 2.2 cm in hard ground during a favourable time (green). This
example was captured at 22:00 on Night 2 of the hard ground study. (Right) The surface cross sectional change in temperature caused by
the TIR anomaly from the buried target.
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includes many complexities only touched upon in the results section. A dedicated baseline study is required to address that question. Further study is also required regarding whether to bury large
cylindrical submunitions such as the BLU-97 and PTAB vertically
or horizontally.
Running a second baseline field study in hard compacted ground
proved that TIR anomalies could be identified in a geophysical
environment other than just soft sand. Hard ground with a heterogenous surface is a more complex environment. It is likely to
add more challenging variables such as potential differences in heat
transfer through a crusty, compacted surface, and perhaps a potentially significant false alarm rate from competing surface objects
such as stones that may exhibit similar thermal profiles to anomalies from buried targets.
We suspect that all the factors have varying influences on the
strength and timing of thermal anomalies from buried targets seen
by the TIR camera. These include variables such as
• air temperature (and changes/rate of change throughout the
diurnal cycle)
• wind (constant speed or gusts)

depth, target orientation
sun (solar radiation), cloud
soil (composition, mineralization, particle size and characteristics, color, proportion of organic matter, and surface
characteristics)
• target (materials, surface area, shape, wall thickness, fill substance, and cavities).
Variables may also include humidity, ground moisture, terrain,
or other factors that we have not recognized yet, acting individually or on a compounded basis. A benefit of conducting a real-world
field study is that all the major variables are likely to be in play—
reducing the chance of omitting any factors that might have a significant impact on performance.
Whether TIR-equipped UAVs can add value beyond current cluster munition land release procedures is a question for the future.
The first step is documenting the real-world capabilities and limits
of the TIR sensor. This was achieved automatically by recording
data twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week from the static
mounted TIR camera at the baseline field site, a feat not possible
at such high temporal resolution when flying TIR equipped UAVs.

Image 3. An image from a microscope of a sample of the hard, compacted, crystalised ground where the second baseline TIR study
took place. You can see how particles appear as a concretion.

Image 4. An image from a microscope of sand particles taken from
the ground featured in this article. Notice how particles are quite
granular.
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Visible

Weak

Not Visible
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Table 8. Anomaly Visibility BLU-97 2.2 cm Depth, Hard Ground, Night.
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Table 9. Anomaly Visibility BLU-97 2.2 cm Depth, Hard Ground, Day.

Conclusions
The studies in two different ground types proved that TIR
imaging can be used to locate sub-surface cluster munitions
at a controlled location in the Iraqi desert. The strength of
thermal anomalies can vary by day, indicating that generalizations cannot be made without more field data to substantiate claims. The first, second, and third priorities should be
more field data collection either at or within close proximity
to legacy contaminated areas.
We have a pathway to move forward: to get on with the
job in a practical way by gathering real-world field data to
decide if and when to operate TIR-equipped UAVs as an
enhanced HMA survey tool. There is no panacea; merits
must be judged on a case-by-case basis for different types of
contamination and each natural environment—in arid and
perhaps semi-arid locations.
Image 5. It is important to visit local CHAs and clearance
sites to understand what weathered targets and the local
environment look like. This is an in-situ, 30-year-old legacy
submunition waiting for demolition. A sample of the sandy
ground magnified under a microscope is shown in Image 4.
An image from a microscope of sand particles taken from
the ground featured in this article, and can be seen as quite
granular.
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Future Work
Our embedded field trials took place under a HMA banner,
meaning that a practical impact-driven approach needs to continue. Working with UAV daylight imagery at simple and advanced
levels will remain the core foundation for activities, expanding
across additional countries. TIR field work both complements
this and spearheads new ways of using UAV technology for HMA.
More empirical data is required such as UAV TIR data from live
CHA sites and gaining more knowledge, particularly regarding
factors such as depth limits, the influence of ground composition,
and seasonality in specific locations.
We are currently setting up more baseline TIR test sites in the
Middle East. Studies will run simultaneously with UAV mapping
using standard cameras. Studies may run for a few days (for a quick
snapshot) or several weeks (if trying to identify weather trends)
depending on budget and logistical constraints each time.
By setting up multiple baseline TIR field test sites around the
globe, the HMA community can scale up efforts to determine the
viability for TIR sensors on a more widespread basis. This can be

Image 6. NPA field staff helping to set up the baseline TIR field test
site in the desert.

achieved through projects that involve technical experts and HMA
operators collaborating together in the field.
For more information see www.mr-au.com.
See endnotes page 74
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developments in Kabul.
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FSD with a better understanding of how details of its intervention interact with that
context, which subsequently allows FSD to adapt its approach in order to minimize
any potential negative impacts of its interventions on the context and to maximize
positive impacts.
With the opening of a new operations HQ in Kunduz, FSD’s demining teams will be
able to clear areas around Kunduz from February to April, and then return to Badakhshan for demining from May to December.
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Topics for The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction
LOW-TECH INNOVATIONS IN MINE ACTION: Technological
breakthroughs can lead to revolutionary new ways of conducting tasks
more efficiently, and while exciting, these often overshadow more
common incremental improvements that ensure progress and advance
demining methods. What practices has your organization improved upon
over the past year?

IRAQ AND SYRIA: Recent conflicts in Iraq and Syria have caused
widespread explosive contamination. How are geospatial technology
and data collection techniques enabling organizations to combat security
concerns and offset reporting challenges? What work is being done
and how have teams on the ground navigated the unique operating
parameters of each country?

HMA’S ROLE IN ENABLING HUMANITARIAN ACCESS: What role does
mine action have in providing humanitarian aid when access is restricted
due to landmines, booby traps, and ERW? How can HMA actors infuse
their skillsets and resources into the conflict-recovery formula and create
the conditions needed for safe and efficient recovery?

IED CLEARANCE (REVISING PRACTICES AND LESSONS LEARNED):
How are HMA organizations adapting their procedures to account for
IEDs? What are your specific technical challenges and how have you
overcome them? What can the broader community learn from your
solutions?

CWD IN THE BALKANS: Countries in the Balkans have stockpiles of
excess conventional arms and stockpiles of aging ammunition inherited
from the Yugoslav Wars of 1991–2001. How are organizations working to
prevent accidental detonations, destroy excess and aging ammunition,
and improve munition storage facilities, including security of stockpiles?

EVOLUTION OF SENSOR TECHNOLOGY: With the evolving nature
of technology and multi-sector collaboration to advance the use of AI,
what has mine action learned and what lies ahead? How is the community
leveraging partnerships to ensure those with the appropriate skills offer
the latest expertise where needed?

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT IN CWD: How are organizations
working to streamline information management for conventional weapons
destruction? How can the sector work together to simplify terminology
and counting mechanisms for small arms and light weapons? And as the
small arms agenda has converged over the years with broader international
policy on gender equality, how can we strengthen integration and analysis
of gender-desegregated data on SA/LW?

DEMINER TRAINING PROGRAMS: As standards and guidance continue
to evolve, so too are the methods being taught by mine action instructors

EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAMS: When newly discovered explosive
ordnance (EO) poses risks to civilians and infrastructure, and when
munitions sites are at risk of explosion, how do quick reaction teams
provide efficient, timely responses to those who need it? What kind
of planning is necessary and what services are teams capable of
providing?
DIGITAL EORE: How are digital tools complementing evolving EORE
activities? How are organizations utilizing digital tools to reach those
most at risk of EO while ensuring the safety of their teams on the ground?
What new and emerging ways are organizations distributing accessible
and inclusive, culturally-appropriate EORE in challenging situations?
CLEARING ROUGH TERRAIN (BEST PRACTICES): Suspected and
confirmed hazardous areas are often remote and require survey and
clearance teams to travel long distances and navigate difficult terrain
before beginning their work. How do organizations address this and
how are teams supplied and supported to conduct remote work in tough
environments?
Direct inquiries or submissions to cisr-journal@jmu.edu

MUNITIONS DESTRUCTION (TECHNIQUES AND EQUIPMENT): When
dealing with surplus or obsolete stockpiles of ammunition or SA/LW,
how can countries efficiently dispose of munitions? What techniques or
equipment are programs using to ensure these weapons are destroyed at
minimal cost while maximizing safety?
BOOBY TRAPS IN URBAN SETTINGS (CLEARANCE OR RISK
EDUCATION): With the rise in use of booby traps in global conflicts,
what are HMA groups encountering in their areas of operation? How
well prepared are deminers to neutralize and dispose of booby traps?
And, due to the improvisational nature of IEDs, how are organizations
modernizing EORE materials to better protect civilians?
THE BLURRED LINE OF HUMANITARIAN AID IN CONFLICT SETTINGS:
Mine action is grounded in humanitarian principles and maintains strict
policies of neutrality and impartiality. When HMA organizations find
themselves in areas with immediate security concerns, does the scope
of their activities change? How do priorities shift to the protection of
staff, and how can organizations ensure the safety of their personnel while
mobilizing critical resources to still pursue humanitarian objectives?
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and technical experts. How is the community of practice ensuring the
latest trends and most critical lessons are taught to the next generation
of demining operators?
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Special Double Issue (26.1 & 26.2)
The Journal invites government/nongovernment organizations, field/research practitioners, policy advisors, and technical experts
working in humanitarian mine action/conventional weapons destruction to contribute their challenges, experiences, and lessons
learned in the form of practice-based article submissions.

Special topic: UKRAINE
HMA organizations and personnel are shifting priorities and
redesigning their on-the-ground operations to accommodate the
situation in Ukraine. Amidst an evolving and complicated situation, a
compromised healthcare system, and lack of surveyed contaminated
land, how are organizations conducting operations in Ukraine? What
are the unique requirements and challenges of working in Ukraine

right now? How do organizations quickly adapt their operations when
conflict erupts? And how is the community targeting specific at-risk
groups such as children or those disabled by explosive ordnance? How
is the sector pivoting and adapting their work in response to the
current conflict?

Special topic: Diversity, Equity and Inclusion (DEI) INITIATIVES IN HMA
DEI encapsulates race, disability, gender, gender identity, nationality, ethnicity, socio-economic status, religion, caste, age, etc. What do DEI
initiatives look like in HMA? What does it mean for HMA donors and organizations to act equitably? What does this sound like (language),
look like (social media), and act like (organizational operations)? The Journal is accepting articles on how organizations are approaching and
encapsulating DEI initiatives within the sector.
•

EQUITABLE SOCIAL MEDIA AND MARKETING: Social media
is a powerful tool for organizations to tell their stories, highlight
operations, beneficiaries, and money well spent. We use social
media to fundraise, raise awareness, and market ourselves. When
highlighting beneficiaries of our programs, are we including the
knowledge, and experiences of those we’re aiding? Are we cognizant
of not using an individual’s disability, socioeconomic status, or
trauma to highlight our needs and successes? How closely have we
evaluated the language we use, and have we taken an intersectional
lens to the ways in which we use images and stories of the people we

‘assist’? How do we create an equitable social media landscape and
move away from aid recipients to partners?
•

ACCESSIBILITY AND INCLUSION: How accessible and inclusive
are our communications, trainings, and on-the-ground operations?
The Journal seeks articles on how the sector is working to ensure
that their daily operations and output—from EORE and survivor
assistance programs and trainings, to hiring and visibility of
all stakeholders—are accessible to and inclusive of our global
community and beneficiaries.

Topics for The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction
DEMINING IN BORDER AREAS: Article 5 of the Anti-Personnel Mine
Ban Treaty obligates State Parties to clear all mined areas on territory
under their jurisdiction or control, including border areas. However,
extension requests frequently cite that border agreements must be
reached before meeting Article 5 deadlines. How can States sharing
borders work together to achieve clearance? How can EORE and survivor
assistance programs adapt to support border communities, migrants,
and refugees? How can casualty data collection improve to better inform
EORE and clearance efforts?
LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR REMOTE SENSING AND ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE (AI) IN HMA: With the evolving nature of AI, what
measures are in place and/or necessary for HMA organizations using AI?
Is there a need for standards within the IMAS? How are organizations
currently using this technology working within national and international
legislation?
EFFECTS OF EORE ON CHILDREN: According to the Landmine and
Cluster Munition Monitor, in 2020, there were 1,872 child casualties where
the age group was known. Children made up half of civilian casualties and
81 percent of child casualties were boys. Children were killed/injured by

mines/ERW in 34 states in 2020, with Afghanistan and Syria having the
highest number of child casualties. How have HMA organizations adapted
their EORE programs in conflict environments such as Ukraine? What
considerations will need to be taken into account in the future? And how
are organizations using social media to reach at-risk populations?
CLUSTER MUNITIONS: According to the Landmine and Cluster Munition
Monitor 2021, cluster munition casualties have been on the rise since
2009, with civilians accounting for all casualties recorded since 2020, and
children representing 44 percent of all known casualties. With casualties
recorded in several countries (Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Iraq, Lao PDR,
South Sudan, Syria, Yemen, and Nagorno-Karabakh) and confirmed use in
Ukraine, how are organizations handling assessments and best practices,
technical/non-technical survey, land release, and EORE?
HISTORY OF SA/LW AND PSSM (LESSONS LEARNED AND THE WAY
FORWARD): How has PSSM evolved over the past decade? The Journal
seeks articles on changes in risk assessment, effective accountability/
inventory systems, conducting training/risk assessments; maintaining
physical infrastructure of storage sites; destruction of surplus and obsolete
stockpiles, etc. What have we learned and what is the way forward?

